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CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVES

DEPOSITORY LIERARY MATERIAL

INDICATORS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS



Labour Canada Travail Canada



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CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVES: INDICATORS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

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PREFACE

Many reports measuring the social and physical well-being of Canadians were published in the 1970s. They included both compendium of statistics relating to virtually all major social issues facing Canadians we well as less ambitious works describing social indicators related to specific topics, for example, health and urbanization. At the heart of such reports was a desire to shed light on the nature and extent of major issues and problems in order that Canadians could make more informed judgements concerning appropriate goals, priorities and policies and programs. This report shares the same aim. It is intended to assist the reader in gaining a better understanding of industrial relations.

As with all such studies, this report suffers from the inadequacies of data. In some cases, data on crucial industrial relations issues are non-existent; in others accuracy or consistency over time are highly suspect or lead to ambiguous interpretation. While these shortcomings should be recognized, even data with most severe limitations are frequently used to support or oppose a position. One should be aware of these limitations so that a fair assessment can be made of the merits of a particular case. If the public is to judge adequately the many facets of the state of industrial relations, it needs access to the kinds of information which the parties most immediately involved in the process use to judge industrial relations.

This report will serve its purpose if it sheds light on industrial relations problems and helps the reader to see these problems in a larger perspective. Over the longer haul, Labour Canada hopes the report will stimulate a search for more pertinent indicators.

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of many people both within and outside Labour Canada. In particular, G. Pelletier who was a member of the project team during the early stages of the study, contributed both to the conceptualization of the study framework and to the collection of statistics. M. Lascelles and G. Clack, officers in the Employment Relations Branch, Labour Canada, offered thoughtful criticism throughout the project. H.L. Laframboise, Assistant Deputy Minister, Program Development and Central Operations took an active interest in the study and gave it his full encouragement. Finally, Research Branches of the provincial departments of labour also contributed by supplying statistics.

R.W. Crowley,
Director-General,
Central Analytical Services,
Program Development and
Central Operations.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this report is to bring together a body of indicators and descriptive statistics which collectively offer a perspective on the state of industrial relations in Canada. A balanced perspective is essential to ensure an informed debate on industrial relations issues and plausible approaches for achieving improvements.

Debate on the state of industrial relations often proceeds from parochial and misleading premises. For example, there is a tendency to use "strike" statistics as the measure of the state. Typically the resulting prognosis is gloomy. In point of fact, "strike" statistics are but one measure of the effectiveness of the collective bargaining process which is part of the broader industrial relations system. A single measure or a set of measures covering one aspect of industrial relations is unlikely to describe adequately or accurately what is happening.

Industrial relations is defined here to include all aspects of the world of work. It encompasses formalized relationships between unions and management through the collective bargaining process and between government and employees and employers through legislation. It also encompasses informal relationships between the employee and employer in the unorganized or non-unionized sector. Beyond this, industrial relations includes the general context of conditions of work which involves physical conditions such as safety and health hazards at the workplace, economic conditions such as job security and pensions, and personal or social conditions such as absenteeism or job satisfaction. Thus, we are dealing with a complex phenomenon with many components, and in making judgements about the overall state we should at the least take the crucial components into account. If we fail to do this, we run the risk of attacking the wrong problem or non-existent problems. Hopefully, the information contained in this report will reduce this risk.

A secondary objective of this report is to draw attention to the shortcomings in the industrial relations data base. Data are lacking which would permit assessment of a number of crucial industrial relations issues and often the data which are available offer only a crude approximation of the concerns in question. Wherever possible, the shortcomings are identified. This is important for several reasons. This knowledge is necessary to establish how far one can reasonably go in drawing conclusions or to determine the assurance one can place in a particular conclusion. The knowledge may stimulate users of the data to search for more meaningful measures or to develop theories which heighten the explanatory power of the data. The knowledge of shortcomings should also aid data producers in helping to provide the kinds of information users need.

Since this report is intended to provide indicators and descriptive statistics which can contribute to a balanced perspective on the state of industrial relations, the first step is to set out a framework within which the various measures can be coherently organized.

The report is divided into five parts describing certain crucial dimensions governing the state of industrial relations. These are the concepts of conflict and conflict resolution/agreement and the spheres of work values, conditions of work, occupational safety and health. These divisions are primarily intended to organize indicators and do not represent mutually exclusive areas of industrial relations. Indeed there is a great deal of overlap and interdependence between the divisions. This is unavoidable. Although several theories of industrial relations exist, none of these provided an analytical framework that would easily accommodate the available statistics.

Conflict is not considered in the report to be inherently bad nor agreement inherently good; they are considered complementary. There are many instances where conflict can relieve tensions which, if permitted to continue, could result in intractable problems. There are often instances where agreement may not fulfill its initial promise with the result that mistrust forecloses future options for more meaningful forms of co-operation. If we are to overcome the narrowness of current debate it must be understood that conflict and agreement are multi-dimensional and allied concepts. The indicators must interpret how well the system is managing inevitable differences of opinion rather than exclusively portraying situations where tensions are not resolved.

The sections on work values, conditions of work and occupational safety and health are intended to demonstrate the full range of concerns in the industrial relations field. These are the areas wherein problems and issues affect workers and managers as individuals and hence have an important bearing on the conflict and agreement processes. They are also the areas where, until recently, public attention has been focused in a haphazard and periodic way. The provision of indicators which broadly define the quality of the work environment should aid in encouraging a more substantive and productive debate.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the selection of indicators requires that several criteria be met. Data must first of all be reliable. They should be timely and preferably available in a reasonably consistent time series. Recognizing that the legislative framework varies by jurisdiction, the data should reflect these differences. Finally, indicators should be chosen because there is likely to be a general consensus on their importance even though they may be interpreted in various ways. Taken together, the indicators should present an image or "state" of the industrial relations system.

2. CONFLICT

2.1 Introduction

There are two dimensions to industrial relations in Canada. One encompasses the organized, or union sector, and the other encompasses the unorganized sector. The organized sector has been generally of greater concern to the public and to governments, because of the impact of collective action. It is on the collective level that conflict is easiest to recognize and deal with. Expressions of individual conflict in industrial relations are much more difficult to identify. Individual conflict is often hidden in other forms of behaviour such as absenteeism or job turnover. It will be examined later in this paper under the Work Values section.

The system of industrial relations in Canada is adversarial in nature. Conflict is an inevitable part of such a system. In point of fact, it is recognized under legislation. Federal and provincial legislation sets out conditions under which strikes and lockouts, the most familiar forms of conflict, can occur. In the following subsections, we examine strike and lockout statistics and explain their deficiencies and describe trends. We also examine briefly strikes and lockouts which take place in contravention of legislation.

2.2 General Qualifications

The most widely used industrial relations indicators are various work stoppage statistics. Certain cautions are necessary to avoid misleading interpretations of the statistics. The importance of these cautions cannot be overstated here, particularly since strike and lockout statistics are the single most important, and often sole, measure used to describe industrial relations.

One general caution is that there are no published "strike" statistics as such. In Canada, as in most other nations, official statistics cover all work stoppages, both strikes and lockouts. Strikes are a refusal to work on the part of employees. Lockouts are the suspension of employment on the part of employers. The practice of reporting both incidents as work stoppages is followed because in many instances it is difficult to determine, short of a judicial inquiry, whether employers have locked out employees or employees have withdrawn their labour. Unfortunately, it is common practice to refer to work stoppages as strikes, which implies withdrawal of labour.

Perhaps the most important caution concerns what work stoppage figures can or cannot tell us about the costs of disputes. The relationship between man-days lost and cost is not necessarily a direct one. Statistics on man-days lost were never meant to be a measure of productive time lost. To estimate the cost of disputes with any degree of precision, we would have to know who is affected and to what extent, and we have very little hard information to make such an assessment.

We can only point to certain cost factors that could apply in certain situations. The employer faces both short- and long-term profit losses, incurring costs related to loss of customers and contracts, extra distribution costs, and loss of trained employees. The firm's suppliers and customers who use the firm's output in their production processes will encounter similar losses. Workers experience loss of income and the difficulties of adjusting to new daily routines. Consumers of end products are affected to a greater or lesser degree depending on how central the products are to their immediate needs. However, we should recognize that all those affected by a dispute are likely to take steps to minimize the costs, whether in anticipation of a work stoppage or after the event. Firms' losses will be reduced by previous stockpiling or abnormally large inventories, by use of excess capacity permitting rapid catch-up of production, by shifting production to other plants, or by use of management personnel to maintain production. For the striking or locked-out employees, loss of wages during the dispute may be made up partly by strike pay or by alternate employment. Over the longer run wages may be made up by subsequent overtime or an improved wage settlement. Extra costs to the general public are mitigated by availability of substitute goods and services, or maintenance of a lower level of operations by management personnel. These factors can moderate the total cost of work stoppages.

Another caution concerns individual attitudes and values toward strikes. The level of work stoppages is often seen as a key indicator of a nation's overall economic well-being. Usually the level is seen as a negative indicator representing economic losses. There is far less awareness that benefits also may accompany the resolution of disputes. Among the benefits are a fairer distribution of income, improved working conditions, safer workplaces, enhanced job security and so on. Furthermore, strikes often permit the venting of accumulated frustrations which can lead to other undesirable forms of conflict such as declining productivity, increased absenteeism and turnover, acts of vandalism and the like. The positive aspects should be weighed alongside the negative aspects of strikes.

One should also be aware that the level of strike activity is influenced by the level of negotiations. There are years in which a large number of contracts come up for renewal and years when the bargaining is "light". Other things equal, one would expect that more frequent bargaining would occasion a higher level of disputes. This particular feature makes it difficult to draw meaningful year-to-year or country-to-country comparisons.(1) The raw data on disputes would have to be adjusted for differences in the level of bargaining and this is seldom done.

Finally there are two additional caveats which apply specifically in making international work stoppage comparisons. First, there are differences between nations concerning what is and is not included under a definition of work stoppages. For example, France, Italy, the United

⁽¹⁾L.A. Kelly, Measuring Strike Activity (Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University at Kingston, 1976).

Kingdom and the United States do not report "political strikes", nor does France report strikes in the public administration sector. If Canada followed a reporting scheme similar to that applied by France, the 1976 work stoppage statistics on days lost would have been lower by approximately 25 per cent. Second, bargaining patterns, whether broad-based or localized, vary among countries, and are likely to have a bearing on the incidence of disputes. One should be aware of such considerations and be prepared to make adjustments for them.(2)

2.3 <u>International Work Stoppage Indicators</u>

Recently there has been concern with Canada's international labour disputes position. The concern was especially evident when statistics for 1976 showed that Canada ranked third among western industrial nations in days lost per worker due to work stoppages. Indeed, the figures for 1974, 1975 and 1976 indicated twice the average level of work stoppages than in the previous six years.

Table 1 presents an international comparison of work stoppages for 10-year periods since 1947. Statistics are provided for the percentage of paid workers(3) involved in work stoppages, days lost per paid worker and days lost per worker involved in a work stoppage for 15 industrialized nations. Each of these statistics covers a different aspect of disputes. The proportion of paid workers involved has been used either as an indicator of militancy or an indicator of whether disputes are localized or epidemic. Thus, the higher the percentage the greater the militancy or the more widespread the conflict. Days lost per paid worker has been used as a proxy for the overall economic losses from disputes. We expressed our reservations concerning this interpretation in the previous subsection. Days lost per paid worker involved in a dispute is an indicator of the duration of work stoppages and hence whether disputes in general are protracted struggles or brief tests of resolution.

An analysis of the percentage of paid workers involved (see Table 1) shows that on this indicator Canada has maintained a middle of the road position over the past three decades. While an upward trend is noted, this trend is common to eight out of the 15 countries. The Canadian experience with regard to the days lost per worker indicator is less favourable, especially between 1968 and 1977. Whereas differences

⁽²⁾ It has been suggested that differences in the level of work stoppages between countries may be accounted for by differences in the degree of unionization. However, according to P. Malles there is no direct relationship. P. Malles, Canadian Industrial Conflict In International Perspective (Informetrica Limited, Ottawa, 1977).

⁽³⁾ By calculating these measures on the basis of paid workers, adjustments can be made for the growth of the labour force while at the same time negating any downward bias due to the inclusion of self-employed persons, paid family workers and employees.

between countries were quite narrow in the 1948-57 period, the differences had increased substantially by 1968-77. In 1948-57 Canada shared the middle ground with seven other countries. By 1968-77 it ranked second. The reason for this was the combination of the increase in percentage of paid workers involved and the relatively high level of days lost per worker involved in a work stoppage. While the duration of work stoppages has declined since 1948-57, Canada has remained in the top three in each time period. Eight other countries have registered improvements on this indicator and only three have experienced an actual increase.

In summary then, the Canadian situation is marked by a low proportion of workers involved but lengthy work stoppages, and hence relatively high time loss. The trend in the proportion of workers involved and time loss has been upward which is a pattern shared by half the other countries examined.

Earlier, the point was made that comparisons among countries over short periods may result in a serious lack of perspective. The following tables have been constructed to show this. Table 2 ranks 16 countries according to the percentage of wage and salary earners involved in work stoppages. The years chosen for comparison represent the low and high points for man-days lost in Canada for each of the last three decades. This enables optimists to look at Canadian performance in its best light and pessimists to look at Canadian performance at its darkest.

On this measure Canada has experienced a middle-of-the road position every year. It has had a lower rank than the United States in four of the six years.

Table 3 presents a comparison of man-days lost per wage and salary earner for the same years. Typically, Canada has ranked higher in this comparison than in the measure of workers involved, again reflecting the long duration of many Canadian disputes, a matter discussed at more depth later on in this section. Canada has ranked third or fourth in each year's comparisons except for 1951 to 1960. However, of the 18 countries compared here, 10 countries contended for the top ranking in these six years, that is, they have placed first, second, or third in at least one of the six years. These include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Spain and the United States.

The foregoing shows that various interpretations of the data are possible depending on which measures are chosen and for what time span. But whatever way one chooses to look at the data, a fair conclusion would be that the level of disputes in Canada has risen relative to other countries. We turn now to examine recent Canadian trends in some detail.

Table 1

Percentage of Paid Workers*** Involved in Labour Disputes, Days Lost Per Paid Worker and Days Lost Per Worker Involved, 10-year Averages for 1948-57, 1958-67 and 1968-77 for Selected Countries

| Country | % Paid | % Paid Workers I | Involved | Days Lost | t Per Paid | d Worker | Days Lost | Per Worker | r Involved |
|----------------|------------|------------------|----------|--------------|------------------|----------|------------|----------------|------------|
| | 1948–57 19 | 1958–67 | 1968–77 | 1948-57 | 1958-67 | 1968-77 | 1948-57 | 1958-67 | 1968-77 |
| Canada | 2 | က | 9 | 4. | 7. | 6. | 18 | 16 | 14 |
| Australia | 14 | 11 | 28 | 7. | 2 | 9 | c | c | ć |
| Belgium | 7 | 2 | 2 | ٠ | | • | n (| 7 (| 7 |
| Denmark | _ | 1 | 1 4 | • | ٠, | 7 0 | ∞ . | ر د | 10 |
| France | 19 | 14 | 12 | • • L | , , , | 7. | 13 | 11 | 9 |
| W. Germany | 1 | * | 1 |) | 7 1 | 7 - 1 | 7 1 | · | 2 |
| Ireland | 2 | ന | 1 LC | ન ત ્ | t ru | K F | - (| 4 ; | ro i |
| Italy | 19 | 19 | 56 | י י |) a | , e L | 19 | 14 | 14 |
| Japan | 00 | 2 |) IC | 7 | 0 6 | Le J | יי ני | 4. | က |
| Netherlands | П | - | | * * | · * | - + | 1 0 | 4 . | m · |
| New Zealand | 5 | m | 10 | | : - k | | _ (| 7 (| 9 |
| Norway | 1 | - | * | , , | : + | 7 4 | , س ا | m ; | m |
| Sweden | * | * | - | • +k | . 4 | < 4 | 15 | 16 | 11 |
| United Kingdom | 3 | 5 | 7 | - | : 0 | e u | 77 | $\frac{12}{2}$ | 10 |
| United States | 5 | m | · (r) | 7 | 7 ~ | С. П | 4 1 | m (| 7 |
| | | | , | | • | 6. | 15 | 15 | 17 |

*Less than 1%

**Less than 1/10 of a day

***The number of paid workers was estimated using a constant change in paid workers between two known figures where yearly figures were not provided.

Source: International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Geneva, various issues).

Table 2

Percentage of Wage and Salary Earners Involved in Work Stoppages and Ranking of Selected Countries for Selected Years

| Country | 15 | 1951 | 19 | 1952 | 1960 | 09 | 119 | 1969 | 1971 | 71 | 1976 | 176 |
|----------------|------|----------|------|----------|------|----------|-----------|------|----------|------|------|------|
| | % | Rank | % | Rank | % | Rank | % | Rank | <i>%</i> | Rank | % | Rank |
| Canada | 2.5 | 6 | 2.9 | 7 | 6. | 11 | 4.2 | 6 | 3.1 | 10 | 17.2 | 9 |
| Australia | 14.3 | n | 17.4 | H | 18.0 | | 29.7 | 2 | 29.1 | - | 44.7 | 2 |
| Belgium | 4.8 | 9 | 11.5 | 3 | 00 | .13 | 6. | 13 | 3.0 | | n.a. | n.a. |
| Denmark | 0.1 | 16 | • 1 | 15 | 1.2 | 10 | 1.9 | 12 | 63 | 15 | 4.3 | 00 |
| Finland | 1.0 | 13 | .5 | 13 | 1.5 | 6 | 5.2 | 7 | 25.2 | m | 26.6 | c |
| France | 14.4 | 2 | 9°4 | 5 | 7.6 | 3 | 9.2 | 3 | 20.2 | 4 | 21.9 | 4 |
| W. Germany | 1.1 | 12 | .5 | 13 | • | 14 | 7° | 14 | 2.4 | 12 | . 7 | 13 |
| Ireland | 3°2 | ∞ | 2.1 | 6 | 6. | 11 | ۳ 0 | 4 | 0.9 | 9 | 5.8 | 7 |
| Italy | 18.5 | | 12.7 | 2 | 17.5 | 2 | 54.2 | - | 28.1 | 2 | 3,5 | П |
| Japan | 8.2 | 4 | 11,1 | 4 | 3.4 | 5 | 4.2 | 6 | 5.6 | 7 | 3.7 | 6 |
| Netherlands | 2.3 | 10 | 1.1 | | 2.3 | 9 | 5.5 | 9 | 2.4 | 12 | C. | 14 |
| New Zealand | 6.4 | 2 | 2.7 | ∞ | 1.9 | ∞ | 4.7 | 00 | 0.6 | 2 | 19.0 | 2 |
| Norway | · 4 | 15 | 9. | 12 | . 1 | 14 | • | 16 | .2 | 16 | 1.4 | 12 |
| Sweden | 9. | 14 | • | 15 | * | 16 | e | 15 | 2.0 | 14 | . 2 | 15 |
| United Kingdom | 1.8 | 11 | 2.0 | 10 | 3.00 | 4 | 7.5 | 7 | 5.4 | 00 | 3.0 | 10 |
| United States | 4.4 | 7 | 7.0 | . 9 | 2.3 | 9 | 3.2 | 11 | 4.2 | 6 | 2.7 | 11 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

n.a. - not available

*Less than 0.1%

Source: International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Geneva, various issues).

Table 3

Days Lost Per Annum Per Wage and Salary Earner and Ranking of Selected Countries for Selected Years

| | 1951 | 51 | 19 | 1952 | 19 | 1960 | 1969 | 69 | 1971 | 7.1 | 15 | 1976 |
|----------------|--------------|----------|------|-------------|------|-------------------|------|-------------------|------|-------------------|------|-------------------|
| | Days Lost | Rank | Days | s E Rank | Days | Days Lost Rank |
| | .22 | 11 | 69• | 7 | .14 | 9 | 1.05 | c | .37 | 7.5 | 1.27 | 2 |
| | .31 | 9 | 040 | 5 | .22 | 3 | .37 | 5 | . 67 | က | .78 | 4 |
| | .24 | 10 | • 36 | 9 | .13 | œ | 90° | 11 | .43 | 9 | n.a. | n.a. |
| | -K | 16 | * | 16 | *0° | 13 | .02 | 13 | .01 | 15.5 | .10 | 10 |
| | .28 | 6 | • 05 | 12 | •07 | 11 | .10 | 10 | 1.64 | - | .67 | 2 |
| | .30 | ∞ | .14 | ∞ | ° 08 | 10 | .14 | 00 | .27 | 9.5 | .29 | œ |
| | .10 | 7 | • 03 | 14 | * | 15 | .01 | 15 | .20 | 11 | .02 | 13 |
| | 9/° | 2 | • 74 | m | .12 | 6 | 1.26 | 2 | .37 | 7.5 | 1.08 | n |
| | .39 | 2 | .31 | 7 | .43 | _ | 2,73 | | 1.07 | 2 | 1.78 | П |
| | .42 | 4 | 1.03 | 2 | • 18 | 4 | .11 | 6 | • 18 | 12 | °00 | 11 |
| | .02 | 15 | .01 | 15 | .14 | 9 | .01 | 15 | .02 | 14 | * | 15 |
| | 2.00 | | • 05 | 11 | • 05 | 12 | .15 | 7 | .17 | 13 | 94° | 9 |
| | °04 | 14 | .13 | 6 | * | 15 | 0.0 | 13 | • 01 | 15.5 | · 00 | 11,5 |
| | .22 | 11 | 03 | 13 | .01 | 14 | • 0¢ | 12 | .27 | 95 | .01 | 14 |
| United Kingdom | • 08 | 13 | 60° | 10 | .14 | 9 | .31 | 9 | .62 | 2 | .15 | 6 |
| United States | 94° | ന | 1,19 | - | .33 | 2 | . 56 | 7 | . 61 | 7 | . 43 | 7 |

n.a. - not available

*Less than 1 1/100 of a day

Source: International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Geneva, various issues).

2.4 Canadian Work Stoppage Indicators

An appreciation of national trends in disputes requires answers to a number of questions. Among these are: Have disputes become more drawn out? Have they become more widespread, involving a greater proportion of the work force? Are there particular factors causing different levels of disputes at certain times?

It has already been noted that the level of work stoppages in Canada has definitely risen over the last three decades. The trend in work stoppages has been upward between 1946 and 1978, whether measured by the percentage of paid workers involved, or working time lost per paid worker. Table 4 presents five-year averages for these two measures.(4) On both measures the pattern is one of high levels of disputes in the immediate postwar years, a downward trend until the mid-sixties, and sharp upturn thereafter. Notwithstanding increases in the average percentage of workers involved in work stoppages, the percentages have remained low.

Table 4

The Level of Work Stoppages in Canada by Five-year Averages

| Year | Workers Involved as % of Paid Workers | Days Lost Per Paid Worker |
|----------|--|------------------------------|
| 946-1950 | 3.1 | .62 |
| 951-1955 | 2.3 | .43 |
| 956-1960 | 1.8 | .37 |
| 961-1965 | 1.9 | .28 |
| 966-1970 | 4.5 | .87 |
| 971-1975 | 6.1 | 1.22 |
| 976* | 18.2 (8.7) | 1.35 (1.26) |
| 977 | 2.5 | .39 |
| 978 | 4.5 | .83 |

^{*}Numbers in brackets exclude "day of protest".


SOURCE: Based on data from Labour Canada, *Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1978* (Ottawa, 1979) and Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Survey* (Ottawa, various issues).


⁽⁴⁾ Using paid workers as a base permit adjustment for employment growth. Using five-year averaging evens out the year-to-year fluctuations in statistics.

A partial explanation of the increased numbers of participants in work stoppages can be found in changes in the structure of industrial relations. A higher proportion of the labour force is now unionized or belongs to a certified bargaining unit, thus opening the avenue of an organized work stoppage to a larger number of workers. There have also been more opportunities for conflict to be expressed in work stoppages in the last decade, because collective agreements cover shorter periods and renegotiation is more frequent. Another factor influencing the statistics is the method of compilation. For example, a group of workers involved in several stoppages during a year would be counted on each occasion. Double counting also occurs where a dispute carries over from a previous year. Other factors influencing the level of participation in work stoppages may include shifts in the average age of workers and the increasing proportion of families with two or more wage earners. the past decade the labour force has become younger with the influx of the "baby boom" age cohorts into the labour market. All else equal, greater militancy might be expected among younger workers. Families with more than one wage-earner will be better able to absorb the wage losses from disputes.

The measure of days lost per worker is similarly affected by statistical methods and developments in industrial relations. The estimate of man-days lost in a work stoppage is based on the maximum number of workers involved at any time during the stoppage. This is certain to result in overestimates of time lost in cases where not every worker participates fully throughout the course of the stoppage. As in the case of the number of workers involved, the days lost to work stoppages will reflect increased union membership and more frequent bargaining sessions. The latter factor applies strongly in this case because the vast majority of days lost is accounted for during renegotiation of contracts (see Table 6).

Turning to the question of whether Canadian disputes have become more drawn out over time, we see that the tendency for stoppages to be lengthy has diminished only slightly over the past 30 years. Work stoppages of long duration - 25 days or more - are still frequent (Chart 1). In each five-year period since 1946, these disputes have accounted for more than two-thirds of the time lost in work stoppages. Conversely, these disputes have generally accounted for about a third of the workers involved in work stoppages in each period but less than a quarter of workers involved in the 1970s. The reasons for this pattern are not known. However, it has been suggested that lengthy disputes are more likely when there are many small units bargaining at the local level because the pressures for settlement are not as great as in cases where disputes are nation-wide or industry-wide. In Europe where nation-wide or industry-wide disputes are more frequent, disputes are of shorter duration.





Not only do disputes in Canada tend to be lengthy affairs but they involve large numbers of workers in each individual strike, as shown in Chart 2. Approximately four out of five workers involved in a work stoppage are from bargaining units with 500 or more workers. However, over the past decade the percentage time lost accounted for by workers in these units has fallen.

To this point it has been shown that the general level of disputes had risen, though with ups and downs. The main factor in this trend appears to be the growing proportion of paid workers involved in disputes. Nonetheless, the proportion remains small and it is clear that the disputes are localized and not widespread. It has also been shown that lengthy disputes and disputes involving a large number of workers have accounted for much of the work stoppage activity, again with periodic fluctuations. Yet over the past decade disputes have become somewhat less protracted and smaller in scale. We turn now to examine industry and regional trends.

Table 5 presents a distribution of days lost to work stoppages by industry. Certain industries have had substantially higher average days lost per employee than others. In each of the periods examined, the mining sector had the highest losses per employee, followed by construction and manufacturing. In general, industry shares of days lost have not changed much over these periods. The exceptions are that the manufacturing share fell from 50 to 40 per cent of the days lost, and the services sector doubled its share of days lost from 5 to 10 per cent, reflecting a combination of the growth of the labour force in that sector and the rapid escalation of days lost per employee. Indeed days lost in the service sector registered a sevenfold increase between 1966-70 and 1976-78 compared with the threefold increase in the manufacturing sector. While the increase for the service sector was greatest, it was also substantial in every other sector.

There have been variations within sectors as well as between sectors. A study of disputes during 1966-70 and 1971-75(5) found that within the manufacturing sector, the transportation equipment industry, primary metal products and the paper industry accounted for approximately half of the sector's days lost to work stoppages. Railway and postal services were responsible for almost half of the time lost in the transportation, communication, and utilities sector in those periods. Clearly particular sectors and industries are more prone to have high levels of disputes. Conflict is much more localized by industry, as indicated by these statistics, than it would appear from national work stoppage statistics.

⁽⁵⁾P. Malles, "Conflict Incidence and Duration in Canadian Industry", Informetrica Limited, Ottawa, December 1977

Table 5

Days Lost to Work Stoppages in Selected Industries,
Canada 1966-70 to 1976-78


| | | ys Lost a | | | Days Lost r Employe | |
|------------------------------|---------|-----------|----------|---------|------------------------|----------|
| Sector | 1966-70 | 1971-75 | 1976-78* | 1966-70 | 1971-75 | 1976-78* |
| Forestry | _ | 1 | _ | .289 | 1.194 | 1.255 |
| Mining | 10 | 6 | 11 | 4.261 | 3.593 | 15.592 |
| Manufacturing | 50 | 47 | 40 | 1.505 | 1.795 | 4.520 |
| Construction | 20 | 16 | 21 | 2.074 | 2.089 | 7.099 |
| Transportation Communication | | | | | | |
| & Utilities | 13 | 14 | 10 | .938 | 1.305 | 2.515 |
| Trade | 3 | 2 | 2 | .100 | .109 | .494 |
| Services Public | 5 | 8 | 10 | .112 | . 265 | .756 |
| Administration | 1 | 4 | 2 | .140 | .510 | .626 |

^{*}Excludes 830 000 days lost in 1976 "day of protest".

Source: Labour Canada, Strikes and Lockouts (Ottawa, various issues) and Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey (Ottawa, various issues).


The regional dimension shows a similar concentration of conflict (Charts 3 and 4), and one which is related to the industrial mix. In the 1966-70 period almost half of all time lost nationally occurred in the Ontario labour jurisdiction, (6) well above its one-third share of national non-agricultural employment. Six work stoppages alone accounted for 44 per cent of all time lost in Ontario in that period, and five of these were in the transport equipment and primary metals industries, which indicates how important regional industrial structure can be in studies of dispute levels. Between 1971 and 1975, disputes in the British Columbia jurisdiction resulted in 20 per cent of time lost nationally, whereas only 10 per cent of national employment fell within the jurisdiction. The manufacturing sector, and in particular the paper and wood products industries, were the major contributors to B.C.'s stoppage record. Quebec's 44 per cent share of national days lost in 1976-78 was largely due to work stoppages in the construction, mining, and public administration sectors.

⁽⁶⁾Provincial data on work stoppages exclude those for firms under federal labour jurisdiction, such as banks, railways, etc.



The Prairies have experienced consistently low losses to work stoppages, relative to the records of Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec, which had the highest losses in 1966-70, 1971-75, and 1976-78, respectively. Every region has had an increase in days lost per employee during the periods covered, the greatest increases occurring in the Federal jurisdiction and Quebec.

The foregoing shows that disputes are concentrated in particular industries and regions. While the impact of disputes may at times have national dimensions, the disputes are not typically nation-wide.



2.5 Contract Status and Work Stoppages

The final subject to be addressed in this section is the degree to which contract status affects the likelihood of work stoppages. There has been some concern about the extent of "illegal" work stoppages. Stoppages are generally "illegal" if they occur when a collective agreement is in force, but they may also be termed thus if a legally required waiting period following termination of a collective agreement is not observed or if mediators or conciliators, where required by law, have not yet intervened in the dispute. The definition of a legal work stoppage can vary a great deal among the various labour jurisdictions. Because it is impossible to use the terms "legal" and "illegal" work stoppages without benefit of judicial decision, it is meaningless to quantify work stoppages by those terms. It is simpler and more relevant to classify work stoppages by the status of the pertinent collective agreement.

The following tables present statistics of work stoppages classified by contract status. This presentation allows us to speculate as to the types of industrial relations conflict and issues that are most likely involved in work stoppages. For example, a stoppage during negotiation of a first agreement or union recognition is often indicative of a reticence to acknowledge the rights of employees to bargain collectively. Conflict which is not resolved at this stage to the satisfaction of both parties may become a "way of life" and may be expressed with more frequency during subsequent negotiations or even during the term of an agreement, perhaps disguised by other issues. This may be a factor shaping the record of work stoppages of long duration for Canada. On the other hand stoppages which occur during renegotiation would appear to have working conditions and wages as major issues, although resolution of problems which arose during the term of the last agreement may also be at issue. Stoppages occurring during the term of an agreement usually indicate problems with the administration of the contract as interpreted by the parties.

Table 6 presents work stoppage data for 1968-78 broken down by contract status at the time of each stoppage. In every year, by far the majority of days lost were during renegotiation of an agreement. But while renegotiation results in a high proportion of days lost, the proportion of workers involved in those stoppages has been lower, which indicates that longer stoppages are the rule during renegotiation. (These stoppages are longer by far than stoppages during the term of the agreement, which involve a substantial proportion of workers but a very small proportion of days lost.)

Table 6
Work Stoppages by Contract Status, Canada, 1968-78

| | During Neg of First A or Union Re | greement | Durin Renegoti of Agree | ation | During of Agree | |
|-------|---|----------------|-------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| | % Workers Involved | % Days Lost | % Workers Involved | % Days Lost | % Workers Involved | % Days Lost |
| 1968 | 2 | 3 | 83 | 95 | 14 | 2 |
| 1969 | 2 | 3 | 79 | 94 | 18 | 3 |
| 1970 | 2 | 3 | 79 | 94 | 18 | 3 |
| 1971 | 3 | 6 | 66 | 85 | 31 | 9 |
| 1972 | 1 | 1 | 93 | 95 | 7 | 4 |
| 1973 | 2 | 3 | 73 | 93 | 25 | 4 |
| 1974 | 1 | 3 | 44 | 77 | 54 | 20 |
| 1975 | 2 | 4 | 64 | 85 | 33 | 9 |
| 1976* | -(1) | 2 | 42(89) | 87 | 57(10) | 10 |
| 1977 | 3 | 6 | 62 | 84 | 35 | 10 |
| 1978 | 7 | 3 | 66 | 92 | 33 | 5 |

^{*}Figures in brackets exclude "day of protest" - less than 1%.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding and exclusion of figures on work stoppages in other circumstances.

Source: Labour Canada, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada (Ottawa, various issues)

The most significant trend has been toward more workers involved in stoppages during the term of an agreement. These stoppages often arise in protest of firing, suspensions or layoffs. Such issues led to stoppages involving 22 000 workers in 1977, or almost a third of those involved in stoppages during the term of an agreement. Other issues cited frequently are sympathy strikes and respecting picket lines, contracting out or hiring of non-union labour or physical working conditions such as safety or cleanliness. These stoppages appear to be largely the result of day-to-day friction between labour and management, and are basically short demonstrations of worker solidarity. They should not be treated lightly, however, since conflict expressed in this way may result in retaliation and recrimination. The grievance procedure required by law in most jurisdictions is intended as a means of resolving differences arising during the term of an agreement, i.e., it is supposed to remove the need for this kind of work stoppage. Increases in work stoppages during the formal agreement may indicate that the grievance procedure is becoming too unwieldy or slow to resolve immediate problems.

2.6 Conclusions

The interpretation of statistics on strikes and lockouts is by no means a straightforward task. We have seen that international comparisons of dispute statistics are subject to many important qualifications. While such comparisons give a snapshot of global trends, the conclusions that can be drawn about any one country are rather limited. Generally, a fundamental understanding of dispute trends can only be had through detailed analysis of the available statistics for an individual country. Even then, the main emphasis must be on what has happened. Given the state of knowledge in the field, discussion on the reasons for trends remains largely speculative.

Over the past decade dispute levels in Canada have risen significantly. This has largely been the result of an increasing proportion of paid workers involved in work stoppages, whether through strikes or lockouts. Nonetheless, the proportion has remained low. In other respects there has been a remarkable consistency in dispute behaviour. For at least three decades, the long, drawn out dispute has been a hallmark. Moreover, disputes remain localized and are concentrated in particular industries and regions. While the norm is for disputes which involve 500 or more workers, industry-wide or nation-wide are infrequent.

There has been some criticism based on work stoppage statistics that industrial relations in Canada had reached a state of near anarchy. The evidence does not support this view. There has also been a tendency to criticize the existing collective bargaining process and suggest the need for a major overhaul. While improvements in the dispute record would be welcome, it is not at all evident on the basis of available statistical evidence that the collective bargaining process is failing. Indeed, the Second Tier Committee on Policies to Improve Canadian Competitiveness, a committee representing joint management and labour views to the provincial and federal governments, wrote in its summary report:

"The Canadian labour relations system...has developed in a manner which, for the most part, operates well. The vast majority of labour contracts are settled without work stoppages. Improvements are, nonetheless, necessary."(7)

We turn now to examine in the next section data pertinent to this statement.

⁽⁷⁾ A Report by the Second Tier Committee on Policies to Improve Canadian Competitiveness (Ottawa: Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1978)

3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR AGREEMENT

3.1 Introduction

In the previous section, we discussed indicators which in a general way measure the extent of conflict in industrial relations. In this section we examine indicators which describe the resolution of conflict, or the extent to which agreement is reached between the parties to collective bargaining. Among these indicators are the percentage of contracts ratified without recourse to a dispute or the assistance of third parties, the length of negotiations, and the period for which a collective agreement remains in force. Finally, other processes for resolving conflict are discussed and the relevant data examined. Again, this section is concerned only with the sphere of industrial relations which involves collective bargaining and collective relations.

These indicators can be interpreted only in the context within which agreement takes place. Virtually all collective bargaining in Canada is covered by federal or provincial legislation.(8) Labour legislation has resulted in increased intervention of third parties in collective bargaining especially since the mid 1960s.(9) Intervention in this sense is not necessarily negative but rather a means whereby conflict can be peacefully resolved or prevented. The issues which arise in labour-management relations are similar to those which arise from other civil disagreement. Hence, the seeking of third-party assistance is analagous to the recourse to judicial decision on cases such as insurance adjudication or breach of contract. The increasing use of legal recourse may reflect a rising awareness of civil rights in labour affairs, as in other fields. The enshrinement of rights in legislation would have little meaning if these rights were never tested. Third-party involvement in labour-management relations can therefore happen in two very different circumstances: in a test of rights, or in an agreed process for handling conflict which cannot be resolved privately.

That a whole legal framework has been established to protect the rights of labour and management is evidence of the complexity of the issues which arise in industrial relations. There may be adjudication or complaints dealing with almost all aspects of collective bargaining, contract provisions and interpretation of laws and regulations. In some jurisdictions procedures for reaching settlement of interest or rights disputes are laid out by law where the procedures are not embodied in the agreement. In other jurisdictions the parties to a dispute may voluntarily apply for assistance. The phase of the dispute at which a third party may or is obliged to step in, and his/her functions, may vary between jurisdictions. These differences are important in interpreting the indicators.

⁽⁸⁾ Exceptions would include fishermen negotiating with a boatowner and professional associations, such as medical associations, negotiating fee structure with regulatory agencies.

⁽⁹⁾ The major source used in reference to legal developments in industrial relations is, H.D. Woods, Labour Policy in Canada, 2nd edition (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973).

3.2 General Qualifications

The data in this section are drawn from two main sources. The data used in Tables 7 and 8 and Charts 5 through 8 are compiled from the Labour Canada data base of major collective agreements. The data base includes agreements covering 500 or more workers in all industries except construction. Some 2.0 out of 3.1 million unionized workers in Canada are covered under these agreements. The primary shortcoming of these data may be the exclusion of smaller bargaining units. Whether or not this is a shortcoming depends on the extent to which the settlement incidence of small bargaining units is different from larger bargaining units. There is no clear cut evidence on what the actual case is and the area is open for future research.

The remaining indicators used in this section are drawn from annual reports of labour boards or ministries of labour. This poses a problem because the data are collected primarily for independent administrative reasons. Thus, the particular aspect reported on and the time period for reporting can vary widely between jurisdictions. Moreover, the terms employed in various jurisdictions may have different meanings and the meanings may change over time to reflect changes in provisions or changes in policies. For these reasons the indicators are not as neatly defined as one might wish and provide a largely impressionistic picture of this area of concern.

Several measurements of agreement in industrial relations have not been included because they are not available in a statistically reliable nor systematic form. Several mechanisms or practices suggest that the parties have made efforts to reach agreement in their own way: these include labour-management consultation, safety committees, employee stock ownership or profit-sharing plans, and appointment of employees to boards of directors. The indicators of third-party intervention should ideally include cases of interest arbitration, or final contract settlement by third parties, but few jurisdictions report these cases. Readers may well find that reports for individual labour jurisdictions give a more complete picture of industrial relations than can this assemblage of data from all jurisdictions.

3.3 Contract Settlements Reached Without Work Stoppages

In the previous section it was shown that stoppages during renegotiation of a contract were responsible for the largest amount of time lost and workers involved in stoppages. However, most settlements are reached without a work stoppage. Settlement of a contract without a dispute signifies that the parties have made the necessary tradeoff to resolve the major issues of the moment during the normal course of collective bargaining.

Chart 5 shows that major settlements reached without a work stoppage far outnumber cases in which a stoppage occurs. The 1977 and 1978 figures indicated an increasing trend toward non-stoppage settlements, with 94 per cent of agreements in these years reached without

stoppages. Nineteen hundred and seventy-two was a low point in that only 63 per cent of employees were covered by non-stoppage agreements. In that year there was a particularly strong regional flavour to the statistics, with both Quebec and B.C. distinctly lower than the average (31 per cent and 55 per cent of employees respectively, see Table 7). Quebec, followed by Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario and British Columbia had the lowest percentage of agreements reached without work stoppages during the 1972-78 period. In terms of percentage of employees covered, Quebec and British Columbia were the lowest over the period. If statistics for specific industries were available, they would likely show that some industries enjoy a much greater tendency to settle without stoppages than do others. This would likely be reflected in the regional differences.

On the whole, however, the large proportion of agreements reached without a stoppage suggests a high degree of co-operation and mutual trust in industrial relations.




Table 7

Major Collective Agreements Settled Without a Work Stoppage by Jurisdiction, 1972-77

| | Percentage of Agreemen | | Percentage Employees Co | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------|----------------------------|----------|
| Jurisdiction | Annual Average 1972-77 | Low Year | Annual Average 1972-77 | Low Year |
| Nfld. | 84 | 62-1976 | 87 | 48-1978 |
| P.E.I.* | _ | - | en | *** |
| N.S. | 85 | 54-1975 | 87 | 74-1974 |
| N.B. | 88 | 81-1974 | 93 | 81-1976 |
| Quebec | 77 | 61-1973 | 74 | 31-1972 |
| Ontario | 87 | 76-1973 | 85 | 70-1973 |
| Manitoba | 94 | 79-1974 | 9 6 | 84-1974 |
| Sask. | 97 | 82-1976 | 98 | 90-1976 |
| Alberta | 94 | 88-1974 | 97 | 91-1978 |
| B.C. | 87 | 70-1976 | 79 | 55-1972 |
| Federal More Than One | 94 | 88-1975 | 93 | 74-1975 |
| Province | 94 | 87-1973 | 94 | 70-1975 |

^{*}No agreements covering 500 or more employees.

Note: Construction industry excluded; agreements covering 500 or more employees.

Source: Labour Canada, <u>Wage Developments</u> (Ottawa, various issues)

3.4 Third-party Intervention in Negotiations

In the introduction to this chapter, it was pointed out that federal or provincial legislation applies to virtually all collective bargaining in Canada and this implies involvement of third parties. During recent decades the use of third parties has increased significantly. There are many factors explaining the growth of government involvement. Perhaps the most important factor is the public perception that unions and management were increasingly unable or unwilling to find common ground in negotiations and that the public interest was not being served. Despite the legitimacy of government involvement on these grounds, the ideal bargaining process remains one of direct negotiation between the union and the employer. In theory, if not in practice, a high proportion of direct bargaining is the preferred goal.

Table 8 shows the pattern of settlements by stage for bargaining situations involving 500 or more employees in all industries except construction. Direct bargaining results in agreement in approximately four out of ten situations and this proportion has risen in recent years. While settlement following third-party intervention is more common than settlement following direct bargaining, the tendency appears to be toward a return to the latter.

Third-party intervention can vary by degree though not all jurisdictions use the same terminology for different stages, nor require the use of the same sequence of stages. Generally, a conciliation officer is the first to enter the scene, followed by a conciliation board, mediator, and finally an arbitrator, depending on the "success" of each phase of bargaining. In cases involving third-party intervention, most settlements are reached at the initial conciliation stage or after a return to direct bargaining following conciliation. Some 80 per cent of all settlements reached during 1967-78 occurred either in direct bargaining, conciliation or direct bargaining following conciliation. The subject of third-party intervention in non-negotiation situations is treated in sub-sections 3.7 and 3.8.

Table 8

Major Collective Agreements by Settlement Stage, Canada, 1967-78

| | Direct | Third Party | Work | |
|---------|------------|------------------|----------|-------|
| | Bargaining | Intervention | Stoppage | Total |
| | % of | Total Agreement | t s | |
| | | employees covere | | |
| 1967 | 41 (36) | 41 (46) | 18 (18) | 100 |
| 1968 | 39 (38) | 47 (43) | 14 (19) | 100 |
| 1969 | 44 (43) | 43 (44) | 13 (12) | 100 |
| 1970 | 35 (32) | 52 (54) | 13 (14) | 100 |
| 1971 | 35 (32) | 51 (58) | 14 (11) | 100 |
| 1972 | 42 (29) | 44 (34) | 15 (37) | 100 |
| 1973 | 38 (42) | 43 (41) | 19 (18) | 100 |
| 1974 | 42 (46) | 41 (41) | 16 (13) | 100 |
| 1975 | 42 (40) | 46 (44) | 13 (16) | 100 |
| 1976 | 44 (50) | 43 (42) | 13 (8) | 100 |
| 1977 | 50 (51) | 44 (46) | 6 (3) | 100 |
| 1978 | 42 (32) | 52 (62) | 6 (6) | 100 |
| 1968-72 | 39 (35) | 47 (46) | 14 (19) | 100 |
| 1973-78 | 44 (44) | 45 (47) | 11 (10) | 100 |

Note: Collective agreements covering 500 or more employees, excluding construction. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Labour Canada, Collective Bargaining Review (Ottawa, various issues)

3.5 Duration of Negotiations

The length of time taken to reach agreement during negotiations may be an indication of co-operation between the parties. Theassumption is that, in general, less protracted negotiations show a more favourable bargaining climate and indicate more willingness to trust the other party. Of course, many factors may play a role in determining how quickly a settlement can be reached. For example, issues on the bargaining table may become more complex with rapid technological and organizational change, resulting in longer negotiation periods independent of the general industrial relations climate. This complexity may increase with increasing bargaining unit size or with multi-unit bargaining. Situations may arise in which either party is extremely vulnerable to a work stoppage, or in other cases indifferent to one, resulting in either fast resolution or extended negotiations. Chart 6 shows that the larger the size of the bargaining unit the longer the period of negotiation.





Chart 7 provides time series data on the average duration of negotiations. There do not appear to be significant trends. The average duration of negotiations is greater by far in the non-commercial sector which includes mainly public or parapublic enterprises. However, there appears to be a movement toward shorter negotiation times in the non-commercial sector over the decade. At the same time, the duration of negotiations in the commercial and manufacturing areas has lengthened somewhat. One should be aware that generalizations which apply to broad sectors need not apply to individual industries within each sector.




3.6 Duration of Collective Agreements

Negotiations of collective agreements provide a means of expressing conflict between the parties. Therefore, a matter of concern is the length of time that agreements cover. Renegotiation every year may result in more conflict than renegotiation every three years. On the other hand, conflict delayed for three years may become unmanageable. However, it is safe to assume that the longer the period covered by a collective agreement, the more mutual trust and co-operation between labour and management. Both employer and union feel sufficiently confident that the other party will live by the terms of the agreement and believe that contract provisions will protect rights and obligations. Because employer and union are not isolated from social and economic developments, the degree to which this mutual trust is expressed in lengthy contracts is affected by such outside events as inflation, unemployment, wage and price controls, and other changes in public policy.

Few indicators have shown as rapid a change as this one (Chart 8). In 1967-72 some 83 per cent of major agreements were for durations of 18 months or longer; by 1977, only 31 per cent of agreements covered periods of that length. From an average of a third of all agreements in 1967-72, the proportion of agreements lasting more than 30 months has declined to only 15 per cent in 1973-78. It would probably be fair to say that inflation and fears of a falling real income were much

to blame for the decline in contract durations in 1974 and 1975, with neither employers nor unions willing to be locked-in to lengthy contracts. Shorter terms might have been expected for 1977 and 1978 because of the anticipation of wage controls being lifted. It may be some time before there is a return to longer-term contracts.



3.7 Unfair Labour Practices and Labour Prosecutions

Third party intervention has taken different forms to deal with conflict not directly related to the negotiation of a collective agreement. Two of these forms are (1) government interception of complaints of unfair labour practices and (2) prosecutions under labour law. The purpose of this intervention is to channel conflict through a third party in order to encourage settlement of contentious issues before they lead to civil litigation or work stoppages.

Complaints of unfair labour practices may be filed against employers or against labour unions and may involve a multitude of sins. Complaints filed against employers frequently cite interference with the formation or administration of a trade union, discrimination against union members, or intimidation of members, officials or representatives of a union. Complaints may be filed against trade unions for interference

with another union's bargaining rights, or for discrimination against union members. By far, the most common cases until now have been complaints against employers, and most of these occur during union organization. Many complaints of unfair labour practices would therefore indicate employer resistance to union organization — perhaps to the basic philosophy of collective bargaining. Disputes at the initial stage of collective bargaining and during union organization have traditionally accounted for a significant number of work stoppages. Since the 1950s disputes at this stage have become less frequent and part of the decline may be attributed to the establishment of complaint procedures in the event of unfair labour practices.

The exact meaning of a given level of complaints is not easy to define. More complaints may mean less flexibility or more dogmatism in relations between the parties — but also may indicate that the plaintiffs seek peaceful mediation of that conflict. It may also indicate a growing awareness of management or employee rights, and greater reliance on the established rules to resolve potential conflict, as an alternative to the withdrawal of services or employment. Increased use of this mechanism provided by labour law suggests that it is working as intended, i.e., to promote peaceful avenues for dealing with differences.

Table 9 shows the number of complaints of unfair labour practices received by various jurisdictions by two-year periods from 1967-68 to 1975-76. Almost every jurisdiction for which data are available registered a distinct peak in these complaints in 1975-76. The upward trend indicates a greater reliance on third parties to resolve differences. However, caution is required in drawing conclusions. Definitions of unfair labour practices vary between jurisdictions as do the actual item reported and the reporting periods. In addition, the legal provisions would have been enacted at different times in different jurisdictions. These considerations deserve much more consideration than can be given here.

Table 9

Complaints of Unfair Labour Practices
(Complaints Received), by Jurisdiction, 1967-76

| 1967-68 | 1969-70 | 1971-72 | 1973-74 | 1975-76 | | |
|---------|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | 4 | 0 | *** | 66ta | | |
| - | - | 13 | 8 | 11 | | |
| 6 | 13 | 13 | 17 | 19 | | |
| | North | 4 | 6 | 15 | | |
| | 71 | _ | _ | _ | | |
| 371 | 318 | 433 | 415 | 764 | | |
| 34 | 35 | 32 | 43 | 65 | | |
| 30 | 63 | 80 | 153 | 170 | | |
| Ohne | Onto | 32 | 35 | 26 | | |
| 129 | 86 | 167 | | 302 | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 0000 | nega . | *** | 73 | 145 | | |
| 15 | 74 | 11 | 21 | 33 | | |
| | 1 - 6 - 371 34 30 - 129 | 1 4 6 13 71 371 318 34 35 30 63 129 86 | 1 4 0 - - 13 6 13 13 - - 4 - 71 - 371 318 433 34 35 32 30 63 80 - - 32 129 86 167 | 1 4 0 - - - 13 8 6 13 13 17 - - 4 6 - 71 - - 371 318 433 415 34 35 32 43 30 63 80 153 - - 32 35 129 86 167 216 | | |

¹¹⁹⁷⁵⁻⁷⁶ includes first 3 months of 1977.

Source: Data from various annual reports of the Labour Relations
Boards and Ministries of Labour for the Provinces and the
Federal Government

Several governments have established procedures for intercepting prosecutions. Under this provision the plaintiff must receive consent of the Minister of Labour before proceeding with legal action covering any aspect of labour law. Consent may be withheld pending efforts of government officials to mediate the dispute. Consent may also be denied if the Minister feels that prosecution could aggravate rather than lessen antagonism.

Data on applications for consent to prosecute are presented in Table 10, but they are sketchy. This is partly because jurisdictions do not report these applications regularly, and because reporting is subject to changes in provisions or their applications. A more complete set of statistics would indicate the extent to which the mechanism is being used, and how much of this type of conflict is resolved by officials before reaching the courts.

²Unfair practices in employment and contraventions of Act

³From 1974 on, request for appointment of an investigator, where a contravention of the Act is alleged.

⁴Number of complaints disposed of:

Table 10

Applications for Consent to Prosecute Under Labour Legislation (Applications Received) by Jurisdiction, 1967-76

| Jurisdiction | 1967-68 | 1969-70 | 1971-72 | 1973-74 | 1975-76 |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Nfld. | | 7 | 3 | 9 | 13 |
| N.B. 1 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 3 | 14 |
| Quebec | 61 | 34 | 100 | _ | - |
| Ontario | 200 | 321 | 304 | 221 | 154 |
| Manitoba | 5 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 25 |
| B.C. ² Federal - | 33 | - | time | 36 | 284 |
| CLRB3 | 32 | 80 | 45 | 2 | 11 |

¹Applications ruled on; 1970 included in 1971-72.

Source: Data from various annual reports of the Labour Relations
Boards and Ministries of Labour for the Provinces and the
Federal Government

3.8 Arbitration of Grievances

Grievances are disagreements on the interpretation of the rights of either party under a collective agreement (hence the title, "rights arbitration"). They may be based on such issues as job security (e.g., disciplinary suspension), union security (e.g., deduction of union dues); administration of pay (e.g., payment of special premiums), hiring and promotion procedures, or a host of other employee, employer and union concerns. Grievances reflect the day-to-day conflict between labour and management and are largely detached from the conflict arising during contract negotiations, although contentious grievance issues may reappear during negotiations. Most grievances are resolved between employer and union before the case advances (or deteriorates) to arbitration.

Once an arbitral award has been rendered, it is final and binding on the employer, the trade union and the employee. Awards may be reviewed by the courts on certain grounds (e.g., where it is alleged that there has been a denial of natural justice). With one exception, all jurisdictions in Canada require that unresolved grievances arising during the term of a collective agreement be settled by arbitration without work stoppage.

 $^{^2}$ As of 1973, applications for board order pertaining to alleged illegal strikes, lockouts, and/or picketing.

³In 1973 the CLRB was given the power to rule on unfair labour practices, which until then were covered by these applications.

Most jurisdictions have had increases in grievance arbitration over the years for which they provide information (Table 11). A number of reasons for the increase may be suggested. First, government arbitration services in their present form were introduced relatively recently in several jurisdictions, and an increase is to be expected as employers and unions become more familiar with the program. Second, the use of arbitration depends on a jurisdiction's policies on third party intervention; during times of industrial unrest, governments may be less inclined to let the parties make a further attempt to agree on their own. Third, arbitration may be encouraged by prior success in arbitration, or realization that a party has nothing to lose by requesting arbitration. Fourth, lengthy delays which are now more common may be to either party's advantage. Increases recorded in arbitration may therefore be a result of both jurisdictional policy and of the behaviour of parties to collective bargaining.

Table 11

Cases of Grievance Arbitration by Jurisdiction,
Canada, 1967-68 to 1975-76

| Jurisdiction | 1967-68 | 1969-70 | 1971-72 | 1973-74 | 197 | 75-76 |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----|-------|
| B.C.1 | 473 | 507 | 496 | 609 | 1 | 150 |
| Sask. ² | 2 | 4 | 5 | 7 | | 6 |
| Ontario ² | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 725* | 1 | 824 |
| Quebec ³ | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 586* | 1 | 354 |
| N.S.4 | n.a. | n.a. | 31 | 21 | | 32 |
| Nfld. ² | n.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 30 | | 45 |
| Federal ³ | 41 | 47 | 54 | 39 | | 98 |
| Federal PSSRB ⁵ | 104 | 325 | 354 | 1 195 | 1 | 162 |

¹Requests disposed of

Data not available for Alberta, Manitoba or Prince Edward

Source: Data from various annual reports of the Labour Relations Boards of the Provinces and the Federal Government

²Requests for arbitration

³Arbitrators appointed

⁴Requests for arbitration, construction industry only

⁵Federal Public Service Staff Relations Board figures for references to adjudication

^{*1974} only

3.9 Back-to-Work Legislation

Collective bargaining rights include, with few exceptions, the right to strike or lock-out. From time to time, however, the perceived public costs of a work stoppage outweigh the benefits of allowing collective bargaining to take its natural course and government enacts ad hoc legislation to order a return-to-work and resumption of operations. The number of these cases is very small in relation to the number of agreements settled. Usually, the legislation calls for binding arbitration or a special investigator to resolve outstanding differences. Because ad hoc legislation applies to only the one occasion, certain industries may be the subject of recurring back-to-work orders over the years. Ad hoc legislation has also been used to restore orderly industrial relations.

The need for back-to-work legislation may result from public inconvenience, major economic disruption, or threats to public safety or health. The rights of consumers of services - commuters, grain marketers, students, or the infirm - are not represented in collective bargaining but at some point the rights of society in general supersede the right to strike or lock-out. This is the justification cited for most back-to-work legislation. Back-to-work legislation has been used primarily in the public and parapublic sectors. A half of the instances have been in the transportation sector and an additional quarter in the education and health sectors.

In all, there were 47 cases of <u>ad hoc</u> labour legislation in the 1965 to 1978 period, and 28 of these were in 1973-78 (Table 12). The highest number in one year was seven, in 1974. Some jurisdictions have been more ready with <u>ad hoc</u> legislation than others; Quebec had 16 cases in the 1965-78 period, the federal jurisdiction 12, and Ontario and British Columbia seven each. Only three provinces have not implemented ad hoc legislation: Manitoba, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.

Table 12

Back-to-Work Legislation by Jurisdiction in Canada, 1965-66 to 1977-78

| Jurisdiction | 1965-66 | 67-68 | 69-70 | 71-72 | 73-74 | 75-76 | 77-78 | Total |
|--------------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Nfld. | _ | 1 | _ | _ | - | | _ | 1 |
| N.S. | **** | - | | 1 | *** | _ | _ | 1 |
| Quebec | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 16 |
| Ontario | 2 | *** | _ | - | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| Sask. | 1 | - | _ | - | _ | 1 | | 2 |
| Alberta | _ | - | ton | - | _ | _ | 1 | 1 |
| B • C • | **** | *** | **** | _ | 3 | 2 | 2 | 7 |
| Federal | 2 | - | - | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 12 |
| Canada | 6 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 47 |

Source: Unpublished data from Legislative Analysis Branch, Labour Canada.

4. WORK VALUES

4.1 Introduction

The desire to work has been termed the "work ethic". In our culture most people see the desire to work as positive and many judge it as a key factor in sustaining a high and improving standard of living. It is understandable then that the state of the work ethic has been a perennial topic of public discussion. The demise of the work ethic has been predicted on more than one occasion but particularly during periods of social and economic transition. Over the past decade we have often heard that a declining work ethic among employees is at the root of problems of low productivity, absenteeism, unemployment and the like. However, in view of the error of past predictions we should be cautious in drawing conclusions.


One of the difficulties in judging the state of the work ethic is that it is frequently lumped together with attitudes to work. The former represents an underlying or fundamental outlook which pervades all aspects of our life and as such is likely to change slowly. On the other hand, attitudes toward work are less deeply ingrained and are conditioned by the characteristics of a job or the job environment. At times it is impossible to separate a general ethic from the attitudes that are spawned from working conditions. For example, high absenteeism or turnover may result from both a poor work ethic in general and from job dissatisfaction. Likewise, a desire for union representation could reflect dissatisfaction with existing employee—management relations, but it could also arise from a desire for security within a very satisfying job. The following indicators must be interpreted with these alternative, possibly conflicting, values in mind.

The indicators are presented in the order of specific to general. Individual work values are examined first, using results of a job satisfaction survey and statistics for absenteeism and turnover. Following that, the collective aspect of work values, indicated by union membership and employers' groups, is examined. Finally, the opinions of the general public are included in order to incorporate a wider societal perspective.

They are for the most part survey data and as such are subject to such problems as sampling error and the like. In addition, much of the data are from attitudinal surveys which inevitably raises queries about the interpretation of the questions and hence their validity. It also raises questions about the match between what one says and what one does. These are qualifications that should be recognized.


4.2 The Work Ethic and Attitudes to Work

The federal Department of Manpower and Immigration completed a survey of work ethics and job satisfaction in 1974.(10) This study found that work was still a central part of life for Canadians. It was cited most frequently as the most important means of achieving one's goals (Chart 9). The study also found that some 97 per cent said they would rather work than collect unemployment insurance, and an equally large number (over 95 per cent) felt that being productive at work was very important.



In that same year, public opinion polls indicated that most people thought they were not working as hard as they had 10 years previously (Chart 10). Interestingly, the 1974 poll showed almost identical results to the same question asked in 1957. Unfortunately, we cannot discern from these results whether the public believes that people are becoming lazier or that work is easier because of changes in technology or fewer working hours.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Work Values (Ottawa, 1975)



Considering the strength of the work ethic indicated in the federal survey, it may seem contradictory that Canadians are selective about the types of jobs they will undertake. Table 13 shows that conditions such as pay, satisfying work, suitable working conditions and good employer-employee relations are important job choice criteria. With this degree of selectiveness, a fair amount of employee turnover or unemployment is to be expected since available jobs are unlikely to meet all the criteria. In some cases this kind of behaviour is interpreted as a rejection of the work ethic. More realistically, it should be seen as a result of a shift in general attitudes to certain categories of jobs, particularly those requiring a low level of skills or involving unpleasant working conditions. Expectations have surely risen because job conditions, on the whole, have risen.

Negative work attitudes are usually described as worker discontent or job dissatisfaction. A general job satisfaction question on the 1974 federal survey revealed that the vast majority of Canadians (88 per cent) are at least somewhat satisfied with their jobs.(11) Other questions worded slightly differently revealed a more moderate level of satisfaction: 59 per cent of those surveyed would recommend their job to a friend without reservations, and 61 per cent would take the same job again without hesitation. All in all, it can be said that Canadians are generally content with their work.

⁽¹¹⁾ The question posed was: "All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job?"

Table 13
Criteria for a Satisfying Job, Canada, 1974

| | Pe | rcentage o | f Responde | ent |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Statement | Agree Strongly | Agree Somewhat | Disagree Somewhat | Disagree Strongly |
| Money "I would not work for less than \$3.50 an hour" | 35 | 17 | 29 | 20 |
| "If I could earn \$7 an hour, I would take any job" | 20 | 13 | 29 | 38 |
| Training "I'll only take a job that I've been trained for" | 12 | 17 | 37 | 34 |
| Working Conditions "I won't work unless the physical conditions suit my needs" | 20 | 30 | 35 | 16 |
| Satisfying Job "I'll only take a job at something I enjoy doing" | 22 | 30 | 36 | 12 |
| Employer/Employee Relations "I can't work for a boss who yells or shouts" | 51 | 20 | 16 | 13 |
| "I can't work on job where I am being watched all the time" | 38 | 24 | 21 | 17 |
| "I can't work for a boss who doesn't think of me as a person" | 57 | 23 | 12 | 8 |
| Morality "Are there industries you would not work at because of a | | Yes | <u>No</u> | |
| personal sense of moral principle?" | | 43 | 57 | |

SOURCE: Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Work Values (Ottawa, 1975)

Different aspects of jobs which provide satisfaction were identified in the survey. Most important were having sufficient authority and information to do the job well, having friendly co-workers and superiors, having interesting tasks, and seeing the results of one's work. Less frequently mentioned were job security, hours of work, quality of supervision, pay, fringe benefits and promotional opportunities. Because these results were obtained from surveying currently employed people, they may tend to understate the importance of security aspects. An unemployed person may set different priorities in searching for a job.

What workers value in a job and their actual experiences do not always match, according to survey results. The greatest discrepancy between aspirations and experience was with respect to promotional opportunities, followed by challenging work, having the proper tools and assistance to do the job, financial considerations and quality of supervision.

While the above suggests that a positive work ethic was still pervasive in the mid 1970s and that Canadian workers were on the whole content with their jobs, there is very little indication of how values and attitudes have changed since then. If Canadian workers have followed the same trend as workers in the United States, there may well have been a major shift in attitudes. A recent study of U.S. employer attitudes since 1950 has found that employees are becoming more discontented and expect more from their jobs than in the past (12) The trend has been to less job satisfaction among clerical and hourly employees, although among managers it has remained about the same since 1950. Individual discontent, as seen in indicators of absenteeism and turnover, may result in costly losses to the firm and the economy, as well as reductions in the self-esteem and morale of individuals.

4.3 Absenteeism


Employees may have several reasons for being absent from work other than for the reason of illness. It is commonly accepted that employees stay home from work because they find it convenient to do so, or because they do not find the work experience rewarding. Personnel specialists have found in a number of studies that personal problems, rather than a poor work ethic, are behind absenteeism. Whatever the case, the extent of time loss through absenteeism is very great, in fact, much higher than that related to strikes and lockouts. Until recently absenteeism has been an unpopular issue, partly because of scarcity of information, partly because it involves less visible individual behaviour (as opposed to collective action), and partly because few organizations have undertaken to confront the problem directly.

A survey of selected Ontario industries in 1975 found that each employee was absent for an average of 2.6 times during the year (Chart 11). The time lost for health and personal reasons amounted to

⁽¹²⁾Cooper, Mr. R, B.S. Morgan, P.M. Foley and L.B. Koplan, "Changing Employee Values: Deepening Discontent?" Harvard Business Review, Jan.-Feb. 1979, pp. 117-125

an estimated 3.2 per cent of working time. This is a substantial loss considering that losses across Canada due to strikes and lockouts accounted for only 0.6 per cent of working time in the peak year of 1976 and averaged 0.4 per cent during the 1970s.

Researchers have found that absenteeism rates can differ greatly between firms or industries.(13) Chart 11 shows substantial industry differentials. When the managers in these industries were surveyed on causes of absenteeism, they most frequently identified factors which were not industry specific such as personal problems and a poor work ethic. Dissatisfaction with working conditions and security associated with good wages were noted with less frequency (Table 14). It is also interesting to note that the Ontario study found absenteeism to be generally higher in larger firms.



⁽¹³⁾ Kelly, Lawrence A., "Reducing the Costs of Absenteeism", IR Research Reports, Sept.—Oct., 1978, Vol. 3, no. 1

Table 14

Various Causes of Absenteeism in Selected Industries in Ontario, as Identified by Managers, 1975

| | Security Associated with Good Wages | Poor Work Ethic | A 0 | Company/industry Characteristics | | Dissatis- faction with Conditions | The Work |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|-----|-------------------------------------|-----|---|----------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Logging | 12 | 29 | 35 | 12 | 47 | 12 | 400 |
| Metal Mines | 5 | 11 | 16 | 11 | 58 | 16 | - |
| Wood Industries | 25 | 30 | 6 | 2 | 47 | 4 | 8 |
| Paper and Allied | 25 | 44 | 2 | | 47 | 19 | 2 |
| Primary Metal | 26 | 50 | - | 5 | 29 | 26 | 7 |
| Selected Transportation | 17 | 38 | | 3 | 55 | 7 | 10 |
| Retail Trade | 9 | 11 | 1 | 3 | 54 | 32 | 15 |
| Banks | - | 11 | - | - | 100 | *** | 2 |
| Accommodation and Food Services | 15 | 24 | 9 | 3 | 50 | 15 | - |
| All Industries Surveyed | 14 | 25 | 4 | 3 | 56 | 16 | 5 |

Note: Percentages will not add to 100 because several establishments identified more than one cause.

Source: See Table 24.

The Labour Force Survey provides a short time series of absenteeism statistics for Canada. From 1975 to 1978, the trend in absenteeism has remained fairly steady (Table 15). In any given workweek during 1975-78, 1.7 per cent of full-time employees lost the entire scheduled workweek due to illness. An additional 2.5 per cent of employees lost part of the workweek due to illness. This means that more than 4.0 per cent of all employees were absent for some portion of the workweek because of illness.(14)

Table 15

Proportion of Full-time Employees Absent
Because of Illness, Canada, 1975-78

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | % | % | % | % |
| Full Week Absence | | | | |
| Male | 1.73 | 1.68 | 1.70 | 1.79 |
| Female | 1.67 | 1.80 | 1.70 | 1.83 |
| Total | 1.71 | 1.72 | 1.70 | 1.79 |
| Partial Week Absence | | | | |
| Male | 2.25 | 2.17 | 2.00 | 2.19 |
| Female | 3.38 | 3.28 | 2.88 | 3.08 |
| Total | 2.62 | 2.54 | 2.29 | 2.49 |

Source: Statistics Canada, <u>Labour Force Annual Averages</u> (Ottawa, 1975-78)

Although women were more likely to lose part of the workweek than men were, the loss of a whole week was almost the same by men and women. One explanation for the higher short-term absenteeism among women (which was also found in the Ontario study) is that women often have greater family responsibilities which require some time away from work.

Whether or not absenteeism should receive more attention as a pressing industrial relations problem must be decided partly by the effectiveness of solutions. The very nature of absenteeism means that it will always occur since illness and personal problems cannot be completely eliminated. However, not all absenteeism is involuntary. While the proportion of absenteeism which could be prevented is an unknown, it should not be overlooked.


⁽¹⁴⁾ The data would be of greater use for analytical purposes if absenteeism was given as a percentage of working time.

It is not possible to be certain of the reasons why employees do not feel like going to work. However, dissatisfaction with the job must be part of the reason why studies relate absenteeism to such factors as the size and organization of the establishment, job content and skills required, and openness of communication with supervisors and fellow workers. Other factors in absenteeism relate to the individual rather than the job: age, education, home life and living style, financial independence and physical health. The problem is further complicated by findings that many people report to work even though they are dissatisfied. It is possible that their dissatisfaction becomes manifested in other behaviour, such as quitting, becoming unproductive or even counterproductive, or engaging in actions such as grievances or work stoppages.

4.4 Turnover (Quits)

The greater an individual's satisfaction with his or her job, the less desirable a change of jobs will be. Dissatisfaction with the job may arise from job conditions or from better, real or perceived, conditions elsewhere. Often dissatisfaction with a job is sufficient reason to quit, although a quit is not necessarily the outcome of dissatisfaction alone or in part. A high quit rate is probably a good indication that individuals are taking definite action to withdraw from unsatisfactory conditions. It is the same type of withdrawal as voluntary absenteeism, but more permanent and more severe.

Establishments report quite different experiences with quit rates. The previously cited Ontario study of selected industries found that in 1975 the average quit rate was 30 per cent. However, a few establishments registered very high quit rates of over 100 per cent. This survey also found that quits accounted for half of all separations, counting layoffs, retirements and discharges, but with considerable variation between industries (Chart 12). Industry quit rates varied from 17 per cent in the paper industry to 59 per cent in logging. Quit rates were also found to be higher in small establishments than in large ones.



When asked to divulge the underlying causes of employee turnover, employers identified dissatisfaction with working conditions and a poor work ethic most often (Table 16). The causes seem to vary by industry. The willingness of employers to tackle their turnover problem is somewhat doubtful - although about 25 per cent of the firms surveyed had admitted that there was a problem, fewer than 10 per cent had made special efforts to solve it.

Although national quit rates are not currently published anywhere, the labour force survey of Statistics Canada asks unemployed persons why they left their last jobs. Chart 13 presents partial quit rates, for all Canadians who quit voluntarily without going immediately to another job. Every year since 1975, at least 2 per cent of employed persons have quit into unemployment. (The year-to-year variations may be related to perceptions of job opportunities, since they fall slightly as unemployment rates rise.)

Table 16


Various Causes of Labour Turnover in Selected Industries in Ontario, as Identified by Managers, 1975

| | Security with Welfare, UIC | Poor Work Ethic | Company Location | | | | The Work |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----|----|----|----------|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Logging | - | 20 | 33 | 33 | 7 | 27 | 7 |
| Metal Mines | 17 | 9 | 39 | 26 | 13 | 30 | 22 |
| Wood Industries | 23 | 19 | 10 | 15 | 8 | 27 | 13 |
| Paper and Allied | 19 | 23 | 2 | 7 | 7 | 40 | 28 |
| Primary Metal | 31 | 29 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 36 | 21 |
| Selected Transportation | 11 | 18 | 7 | 29 | 7 | 18 | 18 |
| Retail Trade | 4 | 31 | 3 | 14 | 14 | 37 | 16 |
| Banks | 3 | 8 | _ | 4 | 7 | 79 | 11 |
| Accommodation and Food Services | 18 | 24 | 7 | 26 | 6 | 25 | 4 |
| All Industries Surveyed | 13 | 22 | 7 | 15 | 9 | 39 | 13 |

Note: Percentages will not add to 100 because several establishments identified more than one cause.

Source: See Chart 11.

⁻ Indicates fewer than 1.0 per cent of the establishments.



Both the Ontario study and the Labour Force Survey reveal that quit rates were higher among young people and among women. Many employers attribute quit rates among youths to a poor work ethic, while it has been theorized that women are more likely to quit because of a weaker attachment to the labour force. While there may be some truth to this, other explanations are possible. One is that youths and women often find themselves in lower level jobs with less satisfying working conditions.

What is not revealed by any of these statistics is the length of service before quitting. It is likely that quits among senior employees are more indicative of serious dissatisfaction than quits among new employees who are experiencing an induction crisis.

The most serious drawback with regard to the interpretation of quit rates is that one does not know whether some people are quitting several times, thus making a problem seem more widespread than it is in fact. For example, a 30 per cent quit rate may mean that, of every 10 workers in the given period, three have quit. Alternatively, it may mean that in that period one person has quit three jobs. In the latter case, job dissatisfaction would be much less widespread than in the former, and could be related to individual problems rather than to workplace problems.

An indicator related to the quit rate is the number of employed persons looking for another job. While this indicator may not represent as deep a dissatisfaction with job conditions as the quit rate, it nevertheless reveals a "wishful thinking" or even an intention to change jobs, perhaps resulting from dissatisfaction.

Table 17 shows that job search was somewhat more frequent among women than men, although, the differences were not great excepting for 1978. Job search was much more prevalent among youths than adults, as may be expected in that new entrants to the labour force are more likely to be exploring the labour market to find the most satisfying employment opportunities.

Table 17

Percentage of Employed Persons Looking for Another
Job, by Sex, Age and Region, 1975-78

| | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Both sexes - | | | | |
| all ages | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| 15-24 years | 5.9 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 6.3 |
| 25 years and up | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
| Men | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Women | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.3 |
| Atlantic Provinces | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.8 |
| Quebec | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Ontario | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
| Prairie Provinces | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| British Columbia | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 |

Source: Statistics Canada, <u>Labour Force Annual</u> Averages, 1975-1978 (Ottawa, 1979)

The job search indicator is the only one in this section which affords analysis on a regional basis. A definite pattern emerges from this analysis. Western Canadians are much more likely to look for alternative employment than are those in Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces. This may be related to the existence of alternate opportunities, however, with more workers in Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces becoming discouraged as job vacancies declined. Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, the perception of alternate opportunities, whether real or not, may contribute to dissatisfaction with an individual's current position.

4.5 Union Membership

The principle function of unions is to represent employees in achieving better working conditions. Essentially, joining (or forming) an employee's union means giving up certain individual rights and obligations for collective rights and obligations. Thus, when an employee joins a union, he or she feels that individual problems can best be resolved through collective action. In this regard, the act of joining involves a change in an employee's attitude to work.

Unions have been formed in recognition of common employees' problems going back to the time of Moses and the bricklayers. In modern times as well as ancient, union membership has been linked to improvement in working conditions — elimination of sweatshop operations, improvement of extremely hazardous conditions and minimizing the capricious and arbitrary elements of employers' actions. Until recently, the main focus of concern has been with physical working conditions and remuneration. Over the past two decades the concern has widened to include matters such as career or job training, satisfying work and good employee-employer relations.

The continuing attractiveness of collective action to improve working conditions would appear to be evident in increasing union membership. In 1968 about two million Canadians were union members; by 1977, there were over three million in all industries (Table 18). With the exception of short periods in the 1920s, 1930s and 1960s, total union membership as a percentage of non-agricultural paid workers has continued to grow since the turn of the century. One of the factors in the recent growth has been the doubling of female membership since 1971, which parallels the rising female participation in the labour force. Another factor has been the upsurge of unionization in traditionally unorganized sectors. Union membership in the service industries has accounted for half of the increase since 1961. Much of the gain has been in the parapublic areas of education and hospital services. The other sector showing major gains is public administration (Table 19). While these sectors have had increases in union membership as a percentage of paid workers, others have experienced declines - mining, construction, and forestry. Much of the early growth of the Canadian labour movement was in these latter industries, but unionization appears to have lagged behind recent increases in employment. Part of the reason for this may be that working conditions have improved a great deal for non-union as well as unionized workers in these industries.

Table 18

Union Membership in Canada, Annual Average and Percentage of Non-agricultural Paid Workers, 1911-20 to 1971-77 and 1968 and 1977

| | Union Membership Annual Average | Union Membership as a Percentage o Non-agricultural Paid Workers |
|---------|------------------------------------|---|
| | (thousands) | % |
| 1911-20 | 214 | 90004 |
| 1921-30 | 291 | 12.9 |
| 1931-40 | 325 | 16.3 |
| 1941-50 | 787 | 25.6 |
| 1951-60 | 1 304 | 32.5 |
| 1961-70 | 1 732 | 31.3 |
| 1971-77 | 2717 | 36.1 |
| 1968 | 2 010 | 33.1 |
| 1977 | 3 149 | 38.2 |

SOURCE: Labour Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1976-77 (Ottawa, 1977)

Table 19
Union Membership in Selected Industries,
Canada, 1961, 1970 and 1977

| | Union Membership | | | Percentage of Change | Union Membership as a Percentage of Paid Workers | | |
|------------------------------|------------------|------|------|----------------------|--|------|------|
| | 1961 | 1970 | 1977 | 1961-77 | 1961 | 1970 | 1977 |
| | (thousands) | | | % | % | % | % |
| Forestry | 56 | 40 | 33 | -8 | 75 | 63 | 41 |
| Mining | 60 | 50 | 64 | 10 | 77 | 40 | 40 |
| Manufacturing | 558 | 769 | 869 | 49 | 40 | 44 | 43 |
| Construction Transportation, | 154 | 238 | 303 | 93 | 50 | 61 | 48 |
| Communication | 282 | 363 | 439 | 31 | 53 | 55 | 53 |
| Trade | 48 | 87 | 132 | 214 | 6 | 8 | 8 |
| Service | 89 | 224 | 781 | 758 | 9 | 12 | 30 |
| Public Admin. | 103 | 328 | 460 | 448 | 29 | 67 | 62 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Canada and Statistics Canada.

In interpreting the meaning of union membership statistics certain qualifications should be understood. In theory individuals exercise free choice in deciding whether or not to join (or form) a union. In practice governments, employers and unions limit this choice in a number of ways, and either impose or deter unionization. example, the closed union shop restricts choice, as do union-breaking tactics among employers. Governments on the one hand have become more accommodating to public service and parapublic unionization and have given labour relations boards greater power to assure fair labour practices in certification and the negotiation of first agreements. On the other hand governments have increasingly enacted conditions of work and occupational safety and health standards which apply to both unorganized and organized workers. While these are positive initiatives, they in fact give to all workers collective rights similar in many respects to those obtained by unions negotiating for their members. Thus, an unintended effect of this legislation may be to reduce pressures for unionization. Since we do not know the overall impact of these kinds of actions, whether on the part of governments, unions or employers, the extent of union membership as an indication of work values or attitudes should be interpreted with some caution.

4.6 Formal Collective Bargaining

Employees organize in collective action by joining or forming a union. Before the union is legally entitled to bargain with an employer, a bargaining unit must be certified by the appropriate labour board. This labour board ensures that the bargaining unit has sufficient support from employees, and that the unit covers employees appropriate for a bargaining unit. Each new certification creates a new actor in the industrial relations system, with a new formal arrangement between employees and their employer. In this way the values of employees are reflected in the structure of industrial relations.

Employers on occasion group together as well, forming bargaining groups. Sometimes they form informal industry-wide associations which do not impose collective decisions on all members. These groups are not always successful because each member in effect has veto power over the group decision. Because of this, governments have enacted legislation allowing employers' associations to be accredited bargaining agents, essentially transferring all bargaining rights to the association. Accreditation thus reflects needs and values of employers very similar to those indicated by certification of employees' bargaining units: a need to countervail union strength, and a willingness to accept the collective rights and obligations involved.

Before presenting the statistics, some qualifications should be noted. First, there are cases of new bargaining groups which are not included in the numbers of either certification or accreditation. Bargaining units may be voluntarily recognized by employers, in which case the unions may not make application for certification. Second, in some provinces there are provisions for conditions of collective

agreements automatically to apply to all employees and employers in an industry (e.g., the Quebec and Manitoba construction industries). Third, applications for either certification or accreditation are assessed in terms of criteria which may differ between jurisdictions and vary over time. A fourth factor is that the number of employees or employers covered by certifications or accreditations is not given; large groups count the same as small ones in these statistics.

Table 20 presents statistics for new certifications by jurisdiction during the 1967-76 period. Most jurisdictions experienced a peak in annual certification activity from 1971 to 1974. Quebec and New Brunswick had their peaks in 1967-68, while Newfoundland had the highest number of certifications in 1976. It is difficult to wholly explain why these peaks happened in those years; probably the attractiveness of the union movement at that time was the principle factor.

Accreditation of employees' groups enjoyed its greatest popularity in 1971-74 as well (Table 21). This is largely explained by the timing of legislation to permit accreditation.

Table 20

Net New Certifications of Bargaining Units by Jurisdiction, 1967-76 (certifications less decertifications)

| | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 |
|----------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Nfld. | 28 | 28 | 45 | 67 | 48 | 54 | 72* | 68 | 69 | 84* |
| P.E.I. | 15* | 1 | 6 | 2 | 15* | 15* | 17* | 7 | 10 | 5 |
| N.S. | 57 | 61 | 80 | 119* | 129* | 101 | 64 | 87 | 46 | 59 |
| N.B. | 71* | 90* | 60 | -1 | -80 | 54 | 60 | 57 | 45 | 30 |
| Ouebec | 1465* | 1285* | 726 | 977* | 440 | 642 | 615 | 475 | n.a. | 807 |
| Ontario | 601 | 661 | 635 | 656 | 517 | 725 | 837* | 870* | 722 | 634 |
| Manitoba | 54 | 36 | 72 | 83 | 106 | 75 | 119 | 153* | 138* | 93 |
| Sask. | 151 | 142 | 109 | 62 | 79 | 152* | 119 | 194* | 147 | 134 |
| Alberta | _ | _ | | ~ | 227* | 216* | 195 | 185 | 192 | n.a. |
| B.C. | 567 | 583 | 647 | 631 | 575 | 669 | 766* | 802* | 733 | 485 |
| Federal | 79 | 79 | 72 | 67 | 86 | 84 | -21 | 5*- | 98* | 73 |

^{*}Number of decertifications not given.

Source: Annual reports of provincial and federal Labour Boards and Ministries of Labour

Table 21

Accreditation of Employers' Groups by Jurisdiction, 1970-1976

| | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Nfld. | 4000 | _ | - | _ | *** | **** | 1 |
| P.E.I. | _ | core | - | _ | - | 1 | - |
| N.S. | _ | 4000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| N.B. | _ | ene | - | 7 | 3 | n.a. | 6 |
| Ontario | | 3 | 11 | 16 | 10 | 0 | 9 |
| Alberta | | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | - |
| B.C. | 6 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 2 |
| Federal | - | **** | PROD | - | - | 5 | 0 |


Source: Annual reports of provincial and federal Labour Boards and Ministries of Labour

4.7 Attitudes to Unions

The public is frequently asked its opinion on various labour issues. Shifts in attitudes toward unions, strikes, and many other topics, and the underlying changes in values, can be discerned from the results of these polls. While it may be meaningless to infer the state of industrial relations from the opinions of the general public, these opinions affect the attitudes of participants in the industrial relations process, which inevitably affects its operation.

One aspect of public opinion surveys is the respect which the public has for unions and their actions. In this sphere, the image of unions in Canada appears to have become tarnished. In 1956, 61 per cent of those questioned by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion thought that labour unions were, in principle, a "good thing" for Canada (Chart 14). In November, 1978, only 46 per cent thought so, and 41 per cent thought they had been a "bad thing". Even in union households, approval of unions in principle has declined, from 84 per cent in 1956 to 60 per cent in 1978.

A general opinion of labour unions may be inseparable from attitudes toward union actions such as strikes. However, the general right to strike was supported by 59 per cent of those polled in 1978, only slightly less than the 65 per cent support in 1951 (Chart 15). However, a 1979 poll showed that only 28 per cent of the public thought that strikes were generally beneficial to union members, while 58 per cent thought they were not (Table 22). Union households were slightly more convinced of the benefits than non-union households - 40 per cent of union households saw benefits from striking, while 50 per cent did not.







Table 22

Opinions on Benefits of Strikes by Union and Non-union Households and by Age, 1979

| | Bene | Benefits of Strikes | | |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--|
| Year | Yes, Benefit | No, Do Not | Don't Know | |
| | % | % | % | |
| 1979 - National | 28 | 58 | 14 | |
| Union Households | 40 | 50 | 10 | |
| Non-union Households | 22 | 63 | 15 | |
| By age: 18-29 years | 44 | 46 | 10 | |
| 30-49 years | 23 | 65 | 12 | |
| 50 years and over | 19 | 63 | 18 | |

The question posed was: 'Do you think strikes called by labour unions are, on the whole, beneficial to union members or not?'

Source: See Chart 14.



The benefits resulting from union membership appear to be less apparent now than a decade ago. In 1977, the question was asked, "Do you think a person should or should not be required to join a union if he or she works in a unionized factory or business?" Only 39 per cent replied yes in 1977, compared with 52 per cent in 1966 (Chart 16). Both union and non-union households are less likely now to approve of compulsory union membership. This response shows an increased objection to the compulsory nature of membership, rather than objection to union membership per se.

Finally, the public has been asked to indicate what it expects to be the biggest threat to Canada in the years to come: big business, big labour or big government. In each year since 1975, big labour has been most often identified, except for 1979, when big government became the major concern (Table 23). This question is probably more tinged with personal connotations than the others, since visions of "big" labour or "big" government or "big" business are bound to be subjective. Interestingly, "big labour" was seen as the villain to a much greater margin in 1976, the first full year of wage and price controls and coincidentally the peak year for days lost in work stoppages. The negative publicity given labour in that year has probably been a serious setback to the labour movement, and it may be some time before it regains the level of respect it enjoyed in the 1950s.

Table 23

Opinions of the Threat to Canada of Big Business,
Big Labour or Big Government, 1975, 1976, 1978 and 1979

| | Area of Concern | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| Year | Big Business | Big Labour | Big Government | Don't Know | | | |
| 1979 - National | 18 | 34 | 37 | 14 | | | |
| 1978 | 21 | 38 | 35 | 12 | | | |
| 1976 | 18 | 43 | 33 | 13 | | | |
| 1975 | 20 | 36 | 29 | 16 | | | |
| By Age, 1979 - 18-29 years | 24 | 27 | 39 | 11 | | | |
| 30-49 years | 16 | 36 | 40 | 10 | | | |
| 50 years | 15 | 36 | 32 | 19 | | | |

The question posed was: 'Speaking of our future, which do you think will be the biggest threat to Canada in years to come - big business, big labour, or big government?'

Source: See Chart 14.

5. CONDITIONS OF WORK

5.1 Introduction

The Canadian worker has only to reflect on the working conditions endured by his grandparents, or even his parents, to appreciate improvements in the monetary and physical aspects of employment. At the turn of the century, a workweek of 54 to 60 hours over six days was standard. Few workers could afford to take holidays at the wages they were paid; employers granted paid vacation at their discretion. Life insurance and other employee welfare plans that are so common today were virtually unknown at that time. Although private pension systems date back to 1870 in Canada, very few workers were covered by these or other work-related welfare schemes until the social welfare movement gained popularity in the 1940s. Workers were not protected from the safety and health hazards of employment until each province passed its Workman's Compensation Act - the first one was passed by Ontario in 1914. While changes in these conditions of work are more perceptible over a long period of time, the last decade's developments in various aspects of working conditions are also clear.

Today's workers owe much of the present working conditions to the strength of the union movement and to the involvement of government. Conditions of work are important subjects of collective bargaining in unionized workplaces. Several of the following indicators deal with only collectively bargained conditions, which at maximum would cover only a third of Canada's employed. While some non-unionized workers enjoy working conditions similar to those in union shops in the same industry, at the employer's volition, collective agreements have been and are still important trend setters in working conditions.

Governments have become increasingly involved in regulating working conditions since the early 1900s. Today, there are not only regulations governing working time, holidays, vacations, etc., but also a number of government managed welfare schemes which extend compulsory coverage to all employees and employers. Social security, unemployment insurance, and medical and hospital insurance provide a minimum level of employee benefits, which the employer may or may not supplement. Before these social plans were instituted, these benefits were exclusively determined by the employer and/or employee.

The working conditions examined here have been grouped into various categories to simplify the investigation of recent trends. The areas covered are hours of work, security of employment, protection of income, sick leave, other leave, and employee welfare plans. Excluded from these indicators is mention of wage rates and earnings. This area alone would demand more space and resources than are available.

The two principal sources for information on conditions of work are Labour Canada's annual survey of working conditions and its data base of major collective agreement provisions. The method of reporting in the former, and the statement of contract provisions in the latter, do not give us the actual number of employees who have certain benefits (e.g., vacation with pay) but indicate under what conditions (e.g., number of years of service) these benefits apply. These reports also indicate the percentage of employees in workplaces where certain conditions exist, whether or not all employees receive those benefits.

5.2 Hours of Work and Leisure

Increasing leisure time is synonymous with declining working time. The trend is quite clear, even over the relatively short period of the last decade, with changes in hours of work, holidays and vacations each contributing to the decrease in time spent at work. Not only are the hours worked changing, but the manner in which they are worked, e.g., shift, overtime, and part-time work, is changing.

An index of working time has been developed in Labour Canada, based on its working conditions survey. It incorporates the standard weekly hours, holidays per year, and vacations per year to arrive at a "net working week". This measure is weighed by the number of employees who work so many hours weekly, and those who can expect to have so many holidays and vacations after meeting certain qualifications (usually a number of service years). The index indicates how much the level of working time has diminished over the last three decades, and which factor accounts for most of the decline. From 1973 to 1977, for example, the net working week declined by 1.0 per cent (Table 24). Over that period, the standard working week declined by 0.9 per cent, holiday time increased by 15.7 per cent, and vacation time increased by 5.5 per cent. The largest changes, however, were in the 1948-57 period when the net working week declined by 11.4 per cent. This was primarily the result of a significant decline in standard weekly hours. The rate of change has slowed markedly since then, excepting for vacations which continued to increase significantly, at least until 1973.

Table 24

Trends in Average Working Hours,
Holidays and Vacation, Canada, 1947-77

| | Otom doud | Holidays | | Vac | Nak | |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| | Standard Weekly Hours | Days Per Year | Hours Per Week | Weeks Per Year | Hours Per Week | Not Working Week |
| 1947 1957 1967 1973 1977 | 45.32 41.63 40.78 40.35 40.00 | 4.18 7.31 8.08 9.13 10.55 | .64 1.12 1.24 1.40 1.62 | 2.22 2.53 2.98 3.86 4.06 | 1.71 1.95 2.29 2.97 3.12 | 42.97 38.56 37.25 35.63 35.26 |
| Per cent Cha | ange: | | | | | |
| 1948-57 1958-67 1968-77 1973-77 | -8.2 -1.7 -2.0 -0.9 | 25 | 7.4 3.9 5.6 5.7 | 1 | 4.0 6.2 33.9 5.5 | -11.4 -3.3 -5.4 -1.0 |

SOURCE: Labour Canada, Trends in Working Time (Ottawa, 1974) and Labour Canada estimates for 1972-77

While the standard working week has registered a small decline over the last decade on average, the proportion of Canadian workers sharing in the decrease is significant. In 1967, only 7 per cent of non-office employees worked less than 40 hours per week; in 1977, 24 per cent worked less than 40 hours weekly (Table 25). The number of office employees working less than 40 hours increased from 76 per cent in 1967 to 86 per cent in 1977. A 40-hour week remained the most popular standard, or normal workweek among non-office employees, while office employees were still most likely to work $37\frac{1}{2}$ hours per week.

Table 25
Hours of Work by Province, 1967 and 1977

| | Hours Per Week | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-----------------------------|----|-------|----------------|----------|----|-------|----------------|--|--|
| | | 19 | 67 | | 1977 | | | | | |
| | Under 40 | 40 | 41-44 | 45 and Over | Under 40 | 40 | 41-44 | 45 and Over | | |
| | (% of non-office employees) | | | | | | | | | |
| Nfld. | 1 | 65 | 4 | 27 | 17 | 73 | 8 | 3 | | |
| P.E.I. | 2 | 64 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 69 | 3 | 4 | | |
| N.S. | 5 | 71 | 6 | 13 | 9 | 71 | 3 | 4 | | |
| N.B. | 4 | 70 | 7 | 14 | 19 | 63 | 11 | 1 | | |
| Quebec | 12 | 59 | 8 | 10 | 26 | 58 | 9 | 2 | | |
| Ontario | 4 | 76 | 8 | 5 | 19 | 70 | 5 | 1 | | |
| Manitoba | 4 | 74 | 7 | 8 | 32 | 62 | 2 | 1 | | |
| Sask. | 4 | 69 | 14 | 4 | 34 | 63 | | - | | |
| Alberta | 2 | 72 | 18 | 4 | 35 | 52 | 3 | - | | |
| B.C. | 9 | 85 | 1 | 1 | 30 | 59 | 1 | 1 | | |
| Canada | 7 | 72 | 8 | 8 | 24 | 64 | 6 | 1 | | |
| | (% of office employees) | | | | | | | | | |
| Canada | 7 | 72 | 8 | 8 | 86 | 11 | _ | _ | | |

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because employees with no standard workweek are excluded from this table.

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1967 and 1977 (Ottawa, 1968 and 1978)

The declining trend in the standard workweek was also visible in provisions of major collective agreements. Chart 17 shows that 36 per cent of employees covered by these agreements called for a standard workweek of less than 38 hours in 1977, compared with only 12 per cent in 1969.(15)

⁽¹⁵⁾Major collective agreements are those covering 500 or more employees, in all industries except construction. The number of agreements and employees in this category rose sharply from 1969 to 1972, which may inordinately affect statistics. Coverage was as follows: in 1969, 425 agreements, 838 005 employees; in 1972, 924 agreements, 1 757 263 employees; in 1975; 1 012 agreements, 2 117 325 employees; in 1977, 1 001 agreements, 2 040 129 employees. The statistics produced will vary to some extent because the universe is not strictly comparable over time. In industrial distributions for 1977 the fishing and trapping industry and the finance industry have been excluded because provisions do not take the usual form in the former, and because the latter had only five agreements in this category.




Table 26
Weekly Hours of Work Provisions in Major
Contracts by Industry, Canada, 1977

| | Less Than 35 Hours | 35 to $37\frac{1}{2}$ | 38 to 40 | More Than 40 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------|--------------|
| | | (% of e | employees) | |
| Forestry | | _ | 94 | 6 |
| Mines | _ | - | 97 | - |
| Manufacturing | *** | 9 | 88 | 1 |
| Transportation Communication and | | | | |
| Utilities | 1 | 21 | 72 | 1 |
| Trade | 3 | 9 | 78 | 9 |
| Commercial, Business and Personal | | | | |
| Services | 16 | 34 | 17 | - |
| Public | | | | |
| Administration | 2 | 66 | 29 | 2 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.

Provincial and industrial differences in standard workweeks can be seen in Tables 25 and 26. Non-office employees in the eastern provinces work more hours in the normal workweek than the average, and in the western provinces work fewer hours. This difference may reflect different labour standards, which are set by provinces. Those involved in goods-producing industries - forestry, mining and manufacturing - are more likely to work longer hours, and those in service industries transportation, communications and utilities, trade, community, business and personal services, and public administration - are likely to work fewer hours than the average. Within these sectors, some industries have much longer than the average standard workweek: logging, fish products manufacturing, veneer and plywood mills, truck transportation, motor vehicle repair, laundries, cleaners and pressers, and restaurants.(16) At the other end of the scale, employees work substantially fewer than average hours per week in the tobacco products, clothing and fur goods, and printing and publishing industries.

While the statistics from the Working Conditions Survey tell us the number of hours in a standard workweek, they do not reveal the actual hours worked. If employees usually work a certain number of hours at overtime rates each week, these hours would be included in the standard workweek. Occasional overtime is not taken into account here. Statistics from the collective agreement provisions are also complicated — the contract may set out a maximum number of hours per week, after which premium rates would be paid, resulting in a contract provision which has little relation to the normal workweek. The Labour Costs series of the Labour Force Survey published by Statistics Canada provides some detail on actual hours worked.

Increases in the number of paid holidays have contributed substantially to the decline in the net working week since 1967. According to the Working Conditions Survey for 1967, 70 per cent of non-office employees (60 per cent of office employees) were given less than 10 holidays per year; in 1977, 80 per cent (85 per cent) received 10 or more, and 11 per cent (10 per cent) received 13 or more (Table 27). In this area, collective agreements have lagged behind general practice. Analysis of major contract provisions showed that in 1969, 30 per cent of employees received more than 10 holidays annually; in 1977, 57 per cent received more than 10 holidays, and 13 per cent received 13 days or more (Chart 18).


Table 27


Number of Paid Holidays by Province, 1967 and 1977

| | Number of Paid Holidays | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|---------------------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|--|
| | | 1967 | | | 1977 | | | |
| | Less Than 7 | 7-9 | 10 and Over | Less Than 7 | 7-9 | 10-12 | 13 or More | |
| | | | (% of no | n-office | emplo | yees) | | |
| Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Quebec Ontario Manitoba Sask. Alberta B.C. | 25 1 5 12 13 4 2 - 13 | 42 69 64 53 57 71 54 58 45 | 20 15 25 27 24 20 42 39 40 29 | 5 5 6 7 2 1 - | 25 15 21 10 15 25 8 9 14 | 48 66 70 80 55 64 91 91 85 93 | 21 1 3 26 10 - | |
| Canada | 7 | 63 | 25 | 2 | 18 | 69 | 11 | |
| | (% of office employees) | | | | | | | |
| Canada | 2 | 58 | 39 | - | 14 | 75 | 10 | |

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because employees for whom no paid holidays were reported are excluded from this table, and because of rounding.

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1967 and 1977 (Ottawa, 1968 and 1978)





Some provincial variation in employees' holidays is to be expected, given the statutory nature of holidays. Of those employees still receiving less than seven holidays in 1977, almost all were in the five eastern provinces. Interestingly, those receiving 13 or more holidays were most likely to be in Quebec or Newfoundland, suggesting a wide intra-provincial disparity in holiday practices.

Industrial differences are also notable: only 26 per cent of employees in trade received more than 10 holidays according to 1977 major contract provisions, while 98 per cent of those in public administration, 63 per cent of mining employees, and 61 per cent of manufacturing employees received more than 10 holidays (Chart 19). The Working Conditions Survey found the greatest number of holidays in the tobacco products, agricultural implements, aircraft, motor vehicles and parts, and iron foundry industries, while restaurants and small hotels provided the lowest number of holidays.

Increased vacation time has been a major factor in reducing an employee's time spent at work. Developments over the last decade are illustrated in Table 28. The figures in the table give the percentage of employees covered by provisions or procedures permitting a given number of weeks or vacation which are in all but a few cases tied to length of service. Thus, the table shows that 22 per cent of office employees were entitled to six weeks of vacation (usually after 25 or 30 years of service), 63 per cent were entitled to five weeks (usually after 20 or

25 years of service) and 85 per cent were entitled to four weeks (usually after 10 or 15 years of service). What is most striking in the table is the rapid spread of the five-week vacation, the introduction of the six-week vacation and the demise of the one-week vacation during the decade. The same trend is observed for both office and non-office employees. Non-office employees enjoyed more favourable provisions in both 1967 and 1977.

Table 28

Annual Vacations with Pay, Office and Non-office Employees, Canada, 1967 and 1977


| Length of Vacation | Offi | ice | Non-o | Non-office | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------|-------|------------|--|--|--|
| | 1967 | 1977 | 1967 | 1977 | | | |
| | (% of employees) | | | | | | |
| l week | 60 | ~ | 56 | | | | |
| 2 weeks | 91 | 89 | 86 | 70 | | | |
| 3 weeks | 81 | 92 | 92 | 98 | | | |
| 4 weeks | 60 | 85 | 76 | 95 | | | |
| 5 weeks | 10 | 63 | 11 | 75 | | | |
| 6 weeks | wee | 22 | _ | 16 | | | |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1967 and 1977 (Ottawa, 1968 and 1969)

In some industries the working time taken up by a long standard workweek is compensated for by a larger number of holidays or by longer vacations according to the preferences of employer and employee. This appears to be the case for the clothing and fur goods industry, laundries, and restaurants. Other industries have been either leaders or laggers in more than one of the three major determinants of working time. The tobacco products industry had lower hours, more holidays, and longer vacations than the average in each case. The fish products industry had higher hours than other industries but also had fewer holidays and shorter vacations.

Hours of work have undergone changes in other areas as well: working in shifts, working part-time, and working overtime. Shift work and overtime are often an obligation on the part of an employee. The right to refuse overtime work has become an issue in certain industries. Major collective agreements covering 28 per cent of employees, in 1977, had provisions for the right to refuse overtime, a slight increase from 25 per cent in 1969. The practice is most prevalent in forestry, mines, manufacturing and trade, probably reflecting the likelihood of overtime being assigned (Chart 20).

The 1975 working conditions survey found that 82 per cent of employees were given the option to refuse to work overtime; 31 per cent of employees did not have to give a specific reason to do so.



The issue of shift work has received a great deal of attention in the past few years. Concerns have been raised about harmful physical and psychological effects on workers.(17) While no consensus has been reached on the seriousness of problems engendered by shift work, we should be aware of the issue and the extent to which shift work occurs. There are no figures on the actual number of employees working shifts in Canada. The figures which are available show the proportion of employees exposed to shift work, that is, the proportion of employees working in firms where shift work is regularly required. The actual percentage of workers on shifts would of course be much lower than the figures for those exposed, and this would especially be the case for office workers. Table 29 gives an irregular and incomplete picture from 1957 to 1969. The trend is for increasing exposure to shift work. Given the amount of controversy on the impact of shift work on the well-being of workers it seems surprising that government agencies have not chosen to collect more complete and more relevant data on the extent of shift work. There may well be a relationship between shift work and absenteeism, turnover, job satisfaction and the like.

⁽¹⁷⁾ For examples of these concerns see M. Maurice, Shift Work (International Labour Organization, Geneva, 1973) or J. Carpentier and P. Cazamian, Night Work (International Labour Organization, Geneva, 1977).

Table 29

Exposure to Shift Work by Sector and by Type of Worker, Canada, 1967 and 1969

| T 1 | in | Establis | f Employ hments w hift Wor | ith |
|---------------------------------------|------|----------|----------------------------------|------|
| Industry Sector | 1957 | 1959 | 1967 | 1969 |
| Manufacturing Plant Workers | 66 | 64 | 73 | 75 |
| Manufacturing Office Workers | * | * | 23 | 30 |
| Industry Composite Office Workers | * | * | 42 | 49 |
| Industry Composite Non-office Workers | * | * | 68 | 71 |

*not available

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry (Ottawa, various issues)

Table 30

Part-time Employment, by Sex, Canada, 1969 to 1978

| | Part-time Employment | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|---------|-------|--|--|
| Year | Male | Female | Total | | |
| | | (000's) | | | |
| 1969 | 264 | 591 | 854 | | |
| 1974 | 336 | 775 | 1 111 | | |
| Average Annual | | | | | |
| Percentage Charge | 5% | 6% | 6% | | |
| 1975 | 301 | 687 | 988 | | |
| 1978 | 342 | 865 | 1 208 | | |
| Average Annual | | | | | |
| Percentage Charge | 5% | 9% | 7% | | |

Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey (Ottawa, various issues)

Part-time work is another arrangement of working hours, which may be a matter of individual necessity, personal choice, or availability of work. Table 30 presents the trend in the number of Canadians who work at part-time jobs. In the 1969-74 period, part-time employment rose by 6 per cent annually, while in the 1975-78 period the number of part-time workers rose by 7 per cent annually. Part-time employment of females has increased faster than male part-time employment in both periods, but the difference was more distinct in the 1975-78 period. The statistical series is discontinuous at 1975 because the definition of part-time work changed under revisions to the Labour Force Survey. Before 1975, workers who normally worked less then 35 hours per week were classified part-time; the revised survey defines part-time work as less than 30 hours per week.

5.3 Job Security

Those who rely on work as their main source of income are rightly concerned about the security of their jobs. Jobs are frequently lost because of impersonal technical and financial considerations which make little allowance for the individual losses that are involved and adjustments that are required. Sometimes personal animosities or discrimination at the workplace result in unjust dismissal. It is not surprising that an elaborate system of layoff and dismissal procedures is provided in many collective agreements, or that government is beginning to intervene in cases of unjust dismissal.

Given the importance of job security, it is instructive to examine the protection afforded under collective agreements. It would be expected that on average these agreements provide more favourable provisions than those covering smaller bargaining units and that similar provisions would not be available to unorganized workers. We should therefore be examining situations of maximum protection, although in practice a company may give more concessions than are covered by the contract provisions.

A basic provision with respect to layoffs is the period of notification. The longer the period of notification, the greater the opportunity for affected workers to seek interim employment. Notification also encourages employers to plan the flow of work more effectively and reduces the chances of haphazard layoffs. Chart 21 shows the majority of workers, 51 per cent, covered under major collective agreements in 1977 were not entitled to a notice of layoffs. There has only been a slight reduction from 53 per cent in 1969. Of those entitled to notice, 42 per cent were entitled to receive one week or less notification and 60 per cent received two weeks or less. While the period of notification remains short, the data show that the situation has improved somewhat since 1969.




Table 31

Layoff and Recall Procedures Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| Provision | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | | (% of em | ployees) | |
| Seniority on Layoff Straight Seniority | 12 | 8 | 12 | 12 |
| Other No Provisions | 57 31 | 51 41 | 47 41 | 52 36 |
| Recall Procedure Inverse Order of Layoff | 11 | 7 | 10 | 9 |
| Other No Provision | 56 36 | 42 51 | 43 47 | 49 42 |
| | | | | |

Source: Unpublished data, Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.

In addition to notification, unions have sought other forms of protection for their members. One such form is that of procedures to determine who is laidoff and who is recalled. The general position of unions is to assure that those with most seniority are the last to be laidoff and the first to be recalled. Table 31 shows that in fact straight seniority provisions on layoff are not the norm. Only one in eight employees were covered under this kind of provision in 1977. A third of employees are not covered by any provision. Recall procedures do not typically require recall in the inverse order of layoff and four out of ten employees have no recall protection.

One of the major causes of layoffs is technological change. In 1977 only 9 per cent of employees covered under major collective agreements were entitled to notice of layoff because of technological change (see Table 32). Yet in other respects employees were covered by provisions that offered protection. For example, in 1977, 23 per cent of employees were eligible for direct compensation through wage or employment guarantees and 27 per cent enjoyed provisions regarding training or retraining. Moreover, 32 per cent of employees were covered by contracts requiring advanced notice and/or consultation and provisions for a labour management committee affected 20 per cent of employees. Clearly much more protection was afforded where the specific issue of technological change was involved than in cases where layoffs resulted from other factors such as weak demand or oversupply. However, it is difficult to say on the basis of the evidence whether or not the level of protection has increased or decreased over the decade.

Table 32

Technological Change Procedure Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|------|----------------------|---|--|
| | (% of emp | oloyees) | |
| | | | |
| 36 | 30 | 35 | 32 |
| 37 | 24 | 21 | 27 |
| 10 | 6 | 4 | 9 |
| 16 | 15 | 18 | 20 |
| 14 | 11 | 20 | 23 |
| 7 | 10 | 8 | 9 |
| | 36 37 10 16 | (% of emp 36 30 37 24 10 6 16 15 14 11 | (% of employees) 36 30 35 37 24 21 10 6 4 16 15 18 14 11 20 |

Source: Unpublished data, Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.

A recent development in the field of job security is legislated protection against unjust dismissal. The federal government proclaimed legislation for workers under federal jurisdiction in September 1978. During the first year in which the legislation was in force, 251 complaints were received. Of these, 161 were admissible under the Canada Labour Code (the employee must have worked for at least a year and must be in a federal jurisdiction industry). The number of complaints was far greater than initially anticipated given the newness of the legislation. The figures suggest that such protection is filling a real need.

5.4 Income Protection

Protection of wages and salaries is as important as maintaining the security of employment. This income protection takes various forms. Those which are examined here are cost-of-living allowances, severance pay and supplementary unemployment benefits, and benefits for those who become ill and temporarily unable to work.

Cost-of-living allowances (COLA), also known as automatic pay escalators or inflation adjustments, protect wage earners from the price rises of consumer goods and services by automatically raising wages as general prices increase. These adjustments take many forms, a few giving a full measure of real income protection, but most providing only partial protection.(18) The most common COLA is a wage increase of x cents per hour which is triggered by a certain point increase in the Consumer Price Index.

An increasing number of collective agreements have contained COLA clauses since 1969, with 43 per cent of employees in major bargaining units being covered by COLA in 1978 (Table 33). The number of employees covered by COLA more than doubled between 1972 and 1975, a reaction to the rapid inflation in the early 1970s. Eighty-one per cent of employees in the mining sector were covered by COLA in 1977, while only 21 per cent in the forestry sector were covered, and 22 per cent in public administration (Chart 22). The prevalence of COLA clauses is probably largely dependent on how favourable contract terms are on wage increases. Favourable terms may in themselves dispel concerns about inadequate protection against inflation.


⁽¹⁸⁾ Recent research by Labour Canada has determined that COLAs existing in 1979 would compensate for 37 per cent of the price rise at a 6 per cent rise in the CPI, and for 45 per cent of the price rise at a 10 per cent rise in the CPI.

Table 33

Cost-of-Living Allowance (Escalator) Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1977 and 1978

| | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|-----------|------|------|
| | | (% c | of employ | ees) | |
| All Industries | 23 | 16 | 44 | 45 | 43 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada and Labour Canada, Cost of Living Allowance Provisions in Major Collective Agreements 1977, 1978 and the First Half of 1979 (Ottawa, 1979)



Employees often invest several years in one firm, becoming familiar with procedures and expert in methods which may not be found elsewhere. Termination of employment can result in severe adjustment problems in finding alternative jobs. In recognition of past services and these special problems, employers may provide additional payments on separation, in the form of severance pay or supplemental unemployment benefits.

The 1967 survey of working conditions found that 17 per cent of employees worked in establishments where separation payments were provided upon termination of employment for various reasons (Table 34). Table 35 shows that in 1969 major collective agreements provided either severance pay, supplementary unemployment benefits, or a combination of the two for 47 per cent of employees. By 1977 this proportion had risen to 57 per cent. The leading industries were manufacturing (72 per cent), transportation, communications, and utilities (66 per cent) and public administration (64 per cent) (Chart 23). In the forestry sector only 18 per cent of employees were covered by this provision. To some extent, these collective agreement provisions reflect the priority which employees place on severance pay, and this may in turn reflect the probability of permanent layoff in each industry, and the case of transferring skills to other companies or industries.

Table 34

Separation Payments and Conditions of Payments by Office and Non-office Workers, Canada, 1967

| | Percentage of Employee | | |
|---|------------------------|------------|--|
| | Office | Non-office | |
| Separation payments provided to employees whose employment is terminated without expectation of recall: | 17 | 17 | |
| Conditions under which payment is made:* | | | |
| - Permanent shutdown or transfer of operations | 9 | 11 | |
| - Lack of work due to changed method of operation | 9 | 12 | |
| - Lack of work due to decline in volume of business | 8 | 9 | |
| - Physical or mental inability of employee to perform work | 8 | 6 | |
| - Other reasons | 5 | 4 | |

^{*}Employers may have specified more than one condition.

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1967 (Ottawa, 1968)


Table 35

Severance Pay or Supplementary Unemployment Benefits (SUB) Provisions in Major Contracts,


Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977


| | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|---|------|-----------|---------|------|
| | | (% of emp | loyees) | |
| Provisions for either Severance Pay or SUB, or combination | 47 | 58 | 50 | 57 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.



Wages and salaries can be reduced severely by absence caused by illness or temporary disability. To protect employees against such losses, many employers provide paid sick leave or income maintenance benefits (Chart 24). The form of these benefits varies a great deal between industries. Paid sick leave is very common in the trade, services and public administration sectors, but almost non-existent in forestry and mining (Chart 25). On the other hand, most employees in the mining and forestry sectors enjoy sickness weekly indemnity benefits, which are less common in public administration, services and trade (Chart 26 and Table 36). It appears that both kinds of provisions are more prevalent in major collective agreements since 1969.








Table 36

Sickness Weekly Indemnity Provisions in Major Contracts by Industry, Canada, 1977

| Industry | Up to 26 Weeks | 27 to 52 | More Than 52 | No Provision |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | | (% of em | ployees) | |
| Forestry | 30 | 39 | | 23 |
| Mines | 14 | 68 | 1 | 5 |
| Manufacturing | 15 | 52 | - | 6 |
| Transportation, Communication | | | | |
| and Utilities | 30 | 8 | - | 40 |
| Trade | 18 | 22 | _ | 40 |
| Community, Business and Personal | | | | |
| Services | 2 | 44 | - | 52 |
| Public Administration | 1 | 9 | _ | 85 |

Source: Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada

Table 37 shows that for all employees covered by the Working Conditions Survey, paid sick leave has become slightly less common, and income maintenance insurance slightly more common. This development was almost exclusively a result of changes to office employees' benefits. Sixty-two per cent of office employees had paid sick leave in 1968, but only 36 per cent had this benefit in 1975. Income maintenance insurance covered 25 per cent of office employees in 1968, but covered 43 per cent in 1975, offsetting to some extent the drop in the percentage of office employees with paid sick leave coverage.

Table 37

Paid Sick Leave and/or Income Insurance Benefit Plans by Office and Non-office Workers, Canada, 1968 and 1975

| | | | 1968 | | | 1975 | |
|----------|---|-------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|----------------|
| | Type of Benefit Plan | Total | Office | Non- office | Total | Office | Non- office |
| | | | | (% of em | ployees |) | |
| A. B. | Paid sick leave only Income maintenance | 44 | 62 | 31 | 36 | 35 | 29 |
| | insurance only | 27 | 25 | 19 | 32 | 43 | 19 |
| С. | Combination of A and B | 21 | 7 | 37 | 28 | . 10 | 38 |


Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1968 and 1975 (Ottawa, 1969 and 1976)

5.5 Employer Welfare Plans

As noted in the introduction to this section, few areas have undergone as great a change as employee welfare plans. Federal government decisions in the 1960s resulted in a universal pension plan and a public health insurance scheme. While employers have played a back-up role in providing benefits supplementary to the basic provisions since then, private pension plans are still an extremely important part of Canada's pension system. Group life insurance remains a major employee benefit. Recently, several employers have provided dental care plans, and a few have begun to experiment with benefits such as prepaid legal programs.


Private pension plans play a vital role in providing security for post-retirement years, supplementary payments under the Old Age Security Act and Canada Pension Plan. Chart 27 shows that membership in pension plans increased by 110 per cent between 1960 and 1976. As a proportion of the paid labour force the percentage of workers covered rose from 34 per cent to 39 per cent over the years 1960 to 1976. The percentage decline from 1974 to 1976 is the result of the increase in

part-time workers, many of whom would not be covered. Statistics Canada has calculated that 51 per cent of full-time employed paid workers were covered in 1976, a rise of 2 per cent since 1974.(19)



Workers in certain industries are in a more favourable situation with regard to pensions than workers in other industries. Almost all workers in the public administration sector are covered and seven out of 10 in the mining sector are covered (Chart 28). Those in the least favourable position work in either the trade sector or the community, business and personal services sector. In the years between 1970 and 1976, workers in the goods-producing industry (manufacturing, mining and construction) generally realized an improvement in their position. This was most marked for the construction sector. Workers in the service sector faced an erosion in their relative position during the same time period. This was particularly the case for those in the finance, insurance and real estate sector.

⁽¹⁹⁾ Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1976 (Ottawa, 1976), p. 15



One of the noteworthy trends in pensions has been the increase in benefits over the last decade. Table 38 shows that by 1976, 75 per cent of recipients in unit benefit plans were entitled to benefits of 2 per cent or more of earnings for each year of credited service compared with only 52 per cent in 1965. Similarly for flat benefit plans, 81 per cent of members were eligible for benefits of less than \$5 per month for each year of credited service in 1965 compared with only 11 per cent in 1976. By 1976 some 38 per cent of members of flat benefit plans were eligible for \$10 or more per month for each year of credited service. The impact of these changes has been significant. Between 1973 and 1975 pensioners' annual incomes from private plans rose by almost 25 per cent.(20)

⁽²⁰⁾ Special tabulations from Revenue Canada as reported in Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1974 and 1976 (Ottawa, 1976 and 1978).

Table 38

Benefit Rates in Unit Benefit Plans and Flat Benefit Plans by Membership, Canada, 1965, 1970, 1974 and 1976

| Type of Plan | 1965 | 1970 | 1974 | 1976 |
|--------------------------------|------|---------|---------|------|
| | | (% of m | embers) | |
| Unit Benefit Plan Benefit Rate | | | | |
| Less than 1.00% | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.6 |
| 1.00% - 1.49% | 12.0 | 11.6 | 8.2 | 6.5 |
| 1.50% - 1.99% | 24.7 | 14.7 | 14.2 | 11.2 |
| 2.00% and over | 52.3 | 65.4 | 70.8 | 75.4 |
| Other | 9.6 | 7.7 | 5.8 | 5.3 |
| Flat Benefit Plan Benefit Rate | | | | |
| \$ 0 - \$4.99 | 80.9 | 34.9 | 26.8 | 11.4 |
| \$5.00 - \$9.99 | 1.8 | 35.0 | 37.1 | 37.2 |
| \$10.00 and over | _ | 0.1 | 6.6 | 37.7 |

Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, 1976 (Ottawa, 1978)

Another aspect of pensions which is of interest is the extent to which employees contribute to pension funds. One might explain the trend to higher benefits in terms of increased contributions on the part of employees. While the level of contributions of those in contributory pension plans has increased in recent years, (21) the proportion of members in contributory plans has declined. Non-contributory plans have continued to gain strength over the last 15 years. On balance it would appear that the cost of benefits is being shifted to employers.

Many employers provide group life insurance for accidental death and dismemberment. Major collective agreements over the last decade have specified increasing employers' contributions, with 41 per cent of employees in 1977 having the insurance premium paid in full by the employer (Table 39). The figure for 1969 was 17 per cent. The amount of benefit has increased as well with 33 per cent of employees having more than \$7 000 insurance in 1977 compared to 11 per cent in 1969. These major collective agreements have mentioned some type of life insurance for about 75 per cent of employees covered in each year shown.




Table 39

Life Insurance, Accidental Death and Dismemberment Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|--------------------------|------|----------|----------|------|
| | | (% of em | ployees) | |
| Employer's Contribution: | | | | |
| 100% | 17 | 25 | 38 | 41 |
| 75% to 99% | 3 | 9 | 3 | 5 |
| 51% to 74% | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| 50% or less | 15 | 13 | 8 | 7 |
| Flat amount, or other | 11 | 10 | 6 | 9 |
| No details specified | 24 | 14 | 16 | 12 |
| No provision | 27 | 25 | 26 | 25 |
| Amount of Benefit: | | | | |
| \$1 000 to \$4 000 | 13 | 15 | 11 | 4 |
| \$4 001 to \$7 000 | 9 | 11 | 12 | 20 |
| \$7 001 or more | 11 | 15 | 21 | 33 |
| Other | 25 | 28 | 23 | 13 |
| No provision | 41 | 31 | 32 | 30 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.

Dental care plans have been a relatively recent development in employee welfare plans. The 1977 WorkingConditions Survey revealed that 35 per cent of office employees and 30 per cent of non-office employees benefited from these plans (Table 40). Most of these plans provided coverage for dependants of employees as well.

Table 40

Dental Care Plans, Canada, 1977

| | | Office | Non-office |
|---------------|--------------------|--------|------------|
| | | (% of | employees) |
| Dental Care F | lan - Provided | 35 | 30 |
| | - Not provided | 63 | 66 |
| | - No information | 2 | 4 |
| Employer's Co | ntribution | | |
| | - 50 to 99% | 8 | 9 |
| | - 100% | 23 | 19 |
| | - No information | 4 | 2 |
| Coverage of D | ependants provided | 34 | 29 |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1977 (Ottawa, 1978)

To sum up, while these statistics point to substantive improvements in welfare plans over the past decade and a half, it appears that the majority of workers in each case do not benefit from private pension plans, group insurance or dental care plans.

5.6 Other Benefits

In this section we examine miscellaneous benefits, primarily types of leave granted by employers: educational leave, leave for jury duty, bereavement leave, and maternity leave. These may be relatively less important benefits than those discussed above, but they may add immeasureably to the quality of working life for the individual.

Educational leave has advantages for both the employee and employer: it encourages the employee to upgrade or diversify his or her skills, thus making them more productive and, at the same time, more mobile. Paid leave for educational purposes was provided for in collective agreements covering 21 per cent of employees in 1977, up from 16 per cent in 1969, but most of the employees covered by such provisions were in the service industry or in public administration (Table 41 and Chart 30). In conjunction with, or in lieu of paid leave, many employers

pay for the courses taken by employees. The 1977 Working Conditions Survey found that 84 per cent of office employees and 56 per cent of non-office employees worked for employers who provided educational assistance outside normal working hours (Table 42). A successfully completed course would be paid for in full by the employer of 41 per cent of office and 26 per cent of non-office employees.

Table 41

Paid Educational Leave Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| | 1964 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|---------------------------------|------|-----------|---------|------|
| | | (% of emp | loyees) | |
| Provision for Educational Leave | 16 | 20 | 21 | 21 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.




Table 42
Education Assistance, Canada, 1977

| | Office | Non-office |
|---|--------|------------|
| | (% of | employees) |
| Employer may provide educational assistance | | |
| - outside normal working hours | 84 | 56 |
| - during normal working hours | 43 | 23 |
| Employer payments for successfully completed course | | |
| - 50 to 74% | 12 | 14 |
| - 75 to 99% | 29 | 15 |
| - 100% | 41 | 26 |
| - No information | 4 | 2 |
| Employer payments for unsuccessfully completed course | | |
| - 50 to 74% | 5 | 4 |
| - 75 to 99% | 1 | |
| - 100% | 12 | 4 |
| - No information | 67 | 48 |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1977

Another benefit is paid leave for jury duty. Although civic authorities usually pay daily fees for jurors or witnesses, the fee level may fall substantially short of daily wages. To compensate for the loss in earnings, employers may provide paid leave for jury duty. In some cases jury duty leave is at regular pay, in others it is the difference between the jury duty fee and regular pay. The 1975 Working Conditions Survey found that 90 per cent of office and 80 per cent of non-office employees were eligible for this benefit (Table 43). In 1977, 79 per cent of employees covered by major collective agreements had paid jury duty specified in the contract, a sizeable increase from 42 per cent in 1969 (Table 44).

Table 43
Paid Jury Duty Leave, Canada, 1967 and 1975

| | 1967 | 1975 |
|------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| | (% of em | ployees) |
| Paid Jury Duty Provided: | | |
| Office Employees | 87 | 90 |
| Non-office Employees | 60 | 80 |
| At Regular Straight-time Pay: | | |
| Office | 64 | 58 |
| Non-office | 27 | 27 |
| At Regular Pay Less Jury Duty Fee: | | |
| Office | 23 | 30 |
| Non-office | 33 | 50 |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industries, 1967 and 1975 (Ottawa, 1968 and 1976)

Table 44

Paid Leave of Absence for Jury Duty (or Court Witness) Provisions in Major Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|-------------------|------|----------|----------|------|
| | | (% of em | oloyees) | |
| Provisions Exists | 42 | 73 | 79 | 79 |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.

Paid bereavement leave has become more common since 1967, as well as becoming lengthier for the average employee. The Survey of Working Conditions found an increase in bereavement leave provisions for non-office employees, and an increase in the number of days granted for both office and non-office groups between 1967 and 1975 (Table 45). Major contract provisions listed in Table 46 do not indicate appreciable changes from 1969 to 1977, other than a slight increase in the proportion of employees covered by bereavement leave provisions, and an increase in the percentage of employees receiving four and one-half to five days paid

leave for a death in the immediate family. The industrial breakdown for 1977 reveals that the services and transportation, communication and utilities sectors are slightly less liberal with this benefit than the other sectors (Chart 31).

Table 45

Paid Bereavement Leave, Canada, 1967 and 1975

| | 1967 | 1975* |
|----------------------------------|----------|----------|
| | (% of em | ployees) |
| Paid Bereavement Leave Provided: | | |
| Office | 95 | 95 |
| Non-office | 76 | 89 |
| Three Days or More Granted: | | |
| Office | 51 | 84 |
| Non-office | 60 | 87 |

^{*}For death in immediate family.


Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1967 and 1975 (Ottawa, 1968 and 1976)

Table 46

Bereavement Leave Provisions in Major
Contracts, Canada, 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1977

| | 1969 | 1972 | 1975 | 1977 |
|----------------------------|------|----------|----------|------|
| | | (% of em | ployees) | |
| Paid Leave of Absence - | | | | |
| Death in Immediate Family: | | | | |
| $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 days | 56 | 54 | 61 | 59 |
| $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 days | 14 | 12 | 13 | 13 |
| $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 days | 1 | 6 | 9 | 11 |
| No provision | 23 | 10 | 11 | 13 |
| Paid Leave of Absence - | | | | |
| Death of Other Relatives: | | | | |
| 1 day | 26 | 27 | 34 | 33 |
| 1½ to 3 days | 14 | 11 | 8 | 9 |
| No provision | 54 | 56 | 53 | 56 |
| NO PLOVISION | | | | |

Source: Unpublished data from Labour Data Branch, Labour Canada.



Maternity leave was available to 95 per cent of female office employees and 90 per cent of female non-office employees in 1977 (Table 47). Maternity leave is intended to give new mothers a period of recovery and adjustment without fear of losing their jobs. Seniority rights were retained during maternity leave for 87 per cent of employees; 52 per cent had seniority accumulated during that period. The maximum period of leave was generally between 16 and 26 weeks. Different industries appear to have their own maternity leave practices; the logging industry provided maternity leave to only 64 per cent of female non-office employees and 67 per cent of female office employees. Only 71 per cent of female non-office employees in finance received maternity leave benefits, compared to 98 per cent of female office employees in that industry sector (Table 48).

Table 47
Maternity Leave, Canada, 1977

| All Industries | Office | Non-office |
|--|------------|----------------|
| | (% of fema | ale employees) |
| Maternity leave available | 95 | 90 |
| Maternity leave not available | 3 | 5 |
| Seniority retained during | | |
| maternity leave Seniority accumulated during | 93 | 87 |
| maternity leave | 54 | 52 |
| Maximum Period of Maternity Leave: | 3 | |
| Up to 15 weeks | 8 | 14 |
| 16 to 26 weeks | 70 | 62 |
| 27 to 52 weeks | 15 | 10 |
| Unspecified duration | 3 | 4 |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1977 (Ottawa, 1978)

Table 48

Maternity Leave Available by Industry,
Canada, 1979

| | Office | Non-office |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|
| | (% of female | employees) |
| Logging | 67 | 64 |
| Mines | 95 | 87 |
| Manufacturing | 89 | 85 |
| Transportation, Communication | | |
| and Utilities | 97 | 96 |
| Trade | 80 | 81 |
| Finance | 98 | 71 |
| Service | 93 | 82 |
| Public Administration | 100 | 99 |

Source: Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry, 1977 (Ottawa, 1978)

6. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY

6.1 Introduction

The average work day in Canada results in four fatal accidents at the workplace. There are many more non-fatal accidents. Each year industrial accidents and occupational illness cost Canadian employers hundreds of millions of dollars and cause untold pain and suffering to the victims. In 1977 the direct cost (to Workers' Compensation systems) of medical services, compensation for lost earnings, and pensions for those injured at work amounted to \$874 million. The indirect costs, such as hiring and training new employees, production losses incurred at the time of the accident and during readjustment, higher insurance costs, and reduced productivity and earning power of the accident victims, are estimated at four times the direct cost.(22)

This evidence and the growing concern of organized labour has been a great stimulus for industrial safety programs. Governments have also moved to protect workers under their jurisdictions in various ways. Recent developments in a number of jurisdictions have been mandatory health and safety committees for all workplaces, and the legal right of workers to refuse work under unsafe or unhealthy conditions. At the same time there is a trend toward consolidation of the multitude of safety rules and regulations governing industrial procedures.

The success of these programs is very difficult to assess given the nature of statistics available on work injuries and occupational diseases. Data are collected from the administrative records of workers' compensation systems and therefore reflect different jurisdictional practices in coverage, benefit provisions, and adjudication of claims. For this reason, much of the following analysis concentrates on work injury experiences by province. Excluded from these data are unreported injuries, especially by those who are not covered by workers' compensation.

6.2 Injury Incidence by Province

Over the last decade, both the absolute number of workplace injuries and the number per worker increased (Tables 49 and 50). The number of injuries is running at about one million annually, which means that on average one out of every 10 workers is injured each year. Almost half of the total injuries are disabling injuries, i.e., scheduled work time is lost in addition to the day of the injury. Labour Canada estimates that 25 working days are lost with each disabling injury (based on the experience of the few provinces that keep records), and this resulted in a total of 11.7 million man-days lost in 1977. The extent of non-compensated time lost remains unknown.

⁽²²⁾ The Canada Safety Council uses a direct-indirect cost multiplier of four, which according to numerous investigations is a conservative one.

Table 49

Total Injuries by Province, 1967-77

| | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| | | | | | | 1000's | | | | | |
| Newfoundland | 11.7 | 11.8 | 10.1 | 10.8 | 11.2 | 12.1 | 13.9 | 14.3 | 12.0 | 13.9 | 11.5 |
| Prince Edward Island | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| Nova Scotia | 25.9 | 25.6 | 24.9 | 25.6 | 26.5 | 28.7 | 30.2 | 31.7 | 30.6 | 30.5 | 28.3 |
| New Brunswick | 24.7 | 23.3 | 23.8 | 24.3 | 24.8 | 24.0 | 25.6 | 27.6 | 27.0 | 26.2 | 23.3 |
| Quebec | 172.7 | 170.6 | 178.3 | 182.4 | 189.5 | 188.4 | 255.1 | 279.6 | 283.9 | 282.7 | 277.5 |
| Ontario | 352.2 | 340.6 | 354.2 | 348.3 | 333.9 | 384.7 | 420.7 | 427.7 | 367.9 | 398.0 | 395.1 |
| Manitoba | 29.8 | 29.4 | 31.5 | 30.6 | 29.9 | 30.8 | 32.0 | 35.7 | 36.2 | 35.7 | 34.5 |
| Saskatchewan | 27.3 | 26.3 | 25.2 | 24.3 | 22.5 | 26.9 | 24.9 | 28.5 | 29.6 | 34.7 | 36.0 |
| Alberta | 57.7 | 56.8 | 62.3 | 60.9 | 63.0 | 65.6 | 72.5 | 83.1 | 83.5 | 100.2 | 104.9 |
| British Columbia | 77.7 | 75.5 | 83.0 | 84.2 | 90.0 | 96.5 | 107.7 | 114.8 | 111.8 | 119.9 | 123.0 |
| All Provinces | 782.1 | 762.0 | 795.4 | 793.7 | 793.5 | 860.5 | 985.7 | 1047.0 | 985.3 | 1044.5 | 1036.9 |

NOTE: Injuries include claims for medical aid only, non-disabling, fatal, and disabling injuries.

SOURCE: Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.

Table 50

Injuries and Disabling Injuries Per 100
Workers by Province, 1968, 1972 and 1977

| | 19 | 68 | 19 | 72 | 19 | 77 |
|---------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------|
| | Injuries | Disabling Injuries | Injuries | Disabling Injuries | Injuries | Disabling Injuries |
| Newfoundland | 9.39 | 4.16 | 8.64 | 4.26 | 7.12 | 3.56 |
| P.E.I. | 6.48 | 3.20 | 7.48 | 3.91 | 6.73 | 3.62 |
| Nova Scotia | 10.33 | 4.38 | 11.00 | 5.10 | 9.61 | 3.76 |
| New Brunswick | 12.26 | 4.49 | 11.71 | 4.41 | 10.29 | 4.02 |
| Quebec | 8.20 | 2.57 | 8.54 | 3.73 | 11.22 | 6.47 |
| Ontario | 11.85 | 3.68 | 11.88 | 5.01 | 10.64 | 4.06 |
| Manitoba | 8.02 | 3.62 | 7.99 | 4.29 | 8.05 | 4.26 |
| Saskatchewan | 7.80 | 3.50 | 8.02 | 3.62 | 9.18 | 4.15 |
| Alberta | 9.52 | 4.06 | 9.78 | 4.16 | 12.08 | 5.02 |
| B.C. | 10.18 | 3.68 | 11.16 | 4.73 | 11.75 | 5.77 |
| All Provinces | 10.04 | 3.44 | 10.31 | 4.45 | 10.75 | 4.94 |

Notes: Including fatalities.

Only injuries reported to Workers' Compensation Boards are included.

Source: Derived from unpublished data from the Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada, and the <u>Labour Force Survey</u>, Statistics Canada (Ottawa, various issues).

Statistics on injuries may be affected by cyclical changes in employment. Inexperienced workers who are sometimes less aware of safety precautions are usually the first laid off in a recession. This could result in a drop in the number of work injuries per week. Conversely, the injury rate could rise at times of full capacity production, simply because increased overtime causes fatigue and production pressures cause negligence.

6.3 Injury Incidence by Industry and Occupation

Provincial differences in injury rates are partially explained by industrial structure. Certain industries are inherently more hazardous for workers than others, as indicated by fatality statistics (Tables 51, 52 and 53). In mines, in quarries and oil wells there were over 13 fatal accidents annually for each 10 000 workers from 1968 to 1977, for a 10-year total of 1 650 fatalities. The forestry industry recorded a fatality incidence only slightly lower than mining. Provinces with more activity in these hazardous industries would be expected to record higher fatality rates. Moreover, if it is assumed that there are a certain number of non-fatal accidents for each accident, the total number of injuries would be higher in those provinces as well.(23)

Workers in certain occupations in several industry groups are also more prone to fatal accidents (Chart 32). Craftsmen and production process workers accounted for 33 per cent of the industrial fatalities in 1968-77. Transportation and communication workers accounted for 17 per cent of fatalities, followed by miners (12 per cent) and labourers and unskilled workers in non-primary industries (11 per cent).

⁽²³⁾ This assumption may not hold if accidents in certain industries tend to be more severe than in others. Statistics on non-fatal accidents by industry are not available.

Table 51

Work Injury Fatalities by Industry, Canada, 1968-75

| | 1966-78 | 1969-71 | 1972-74 | 1975-77 |
|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Agriculture | 112 | 67 | 91 | 46 |
| Forestry | 318 | 275 | 255 | 196 |
| Fishing, Hunting | 89 | 54 | 36 | 72 |
| Mines, Quarries and Oil Wells | 463 | 474 | 541 | 447 |
| Manufacturing | 583 | 570 | 784 | 593 |
| Construction | 733 | 654 | 659 | 576 |
| Transportation, Communication | | | | |
| and Utilities | 666 | 596 | 723 | 605 |
| Trade | 181 | 201 | 276 | 207 |
| Finance, Insurance and Real | | | | |
| Estate | 6 | 9 | 18 | 21 |
| Community, Business and | | | | |
| Personal Services | 143 | 175 | 305 | 204 |
| Public Administration and | | | | |
| Defence | 128 | 211 | 219 | 187 |
| Total | 3 422 | 2 200 | 9 007 | 0.454 |
| TOtal | 3 422 | 3 286 | 3 907 | 3 154 |

NOTE: Includes fatalities resulting from occupational chest diseases such as silicosis, lung cancer, etc.

SOURCE: Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.

Table 52
Work Injury Fatalities Per 100 Workers, by Industry, 1968-77 Annual Averages

| | 1968-71 | 1972-74 | 1975-77 |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------|-----------|
| Agriculture | 0.004 .004 | .007 | .003 |
| Forestry | .125 | .112 | .096 |
| Fishing | .085 | .047 | .118 |
| Mining | .131 | .152 | .102 |
| Manufacturing | .011 | .014 | .010 |
| Construction | .046 | .041 | .030 |
| Transportation | .028 | .033 | .024 |
| Trade | .005 | .006 | .004 |
| Finance | .001 | .002 | .003 |
| Service | .003 | .004 | .003 |
| Public Administration | .014 | .013 | .009 |
| Total | .014 | .015 | J∳ 1 .011 |

NOTE: Includes deaths arising from occupational illnesses. These rates are underestimated because not all persons employed are covered by Workers' Compensation.


SOURCE: Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.

Table 53
Work Injury Fatalities by Province and Industry, 1975-77

| | Total Fatalities | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| | Nfld. | P.E.I. | N.S. | N.B. | Que. | Ont. | Man. | Sask. | Alta. | B _• C _• | All Canada |
| Agriculture | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 29 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 46 |
| Forestry | 3 | 0 | 2 | 12 | 40 | 29 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 94 | 196 |
| Fishing | 14 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 72 |
| Mining | 32 | 0. | 18 | 9 | 53 | 158 | 30 | 14 | 65 | 68 | 447 |
| Manufacturing | 6 | 0 | 15 | 7 | 154 | 247 | 19 | 14 | 39 | 92 | 593 |
| Construction | 15 | 3 | 18 | 21 | 149 | 144 | 19 | 28 | 95 | 84 | 576 |
| Transportation | 9 | 3 | 9 | 16 | 113 | 169 | 34 | 32 | 89 | 131 | 605 |
| Trade | 2 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 50 | 68 | 11 | 13 | 32 | 21 | 207 |
| Finance | 0 | 0 | 0 | . 0 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 21 |
| Service Public | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 56 | 53 | 10 | 15 | 26 | 37 | 204 |
| Administration | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 51 | 60 | 14 | 9 | 24 | 17 | 187 |
| Total | 86 | 9 | 75 | 79 | 682 | 970 | 141 | 135 | 386 | 591 | 3 154 |

Note: Includes deaths arising from occupational illnesses.

Source: Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.



6.4 Other Considerations

Most fatalities involve males and those aged 25 years and older (Table 54). Of all fatal injuries in 1968-77, 99 per cent were males. This may be largely attributable to the traditional concentration of males in high-risk occupations, but such an overwhelming concentration suggests that there may be less safety awareness among males. Workers aged 25 years or older have accounted for 82 per cent of fatalities in 1968-77, which is close to their proportion of total employment.

Knowing which industries or occupations are most hazardous can be helpful in setting up accident prevention programs. The type of accident most likely to cause death is also useful to know. Since 1966, the most common industrial fatality involved public transport or motor vehicles (24 per cent of fatalities) or was caused by being struck by or against an object (22 per cent), or by a fall or slip (19 per cent).(24) The same types of accidents frequently occur during leisure activities, indicating that safety awareness at work cannot be isolated from safety awareness in other pursuits.

Included in the above are cases of industrial disease, which has not been dealt with consistently over the period for which statistics are available. Recently there has been concern that diseases previously thought to be independent of the work environment are in fact related to one's occupation or workplace. Workers' Compensation statistics might therefore not have always included some of these claims of industrial diseases.

In addition to commonly known injuries and diseases, certain occupational diseases may never be recorded as work-related, because of the difficulty of attributing them to one principal cause. Work-related stress or fatigue may contribute to heart diseases, psychoses and neuroses, resulting in significant losses in the individual's abilities, productivity, and earning power.

⁽²⁴⁾Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.

Table 54
Work Injury Fatalities by Age and Sex,
Annual Averages, Canada, 1968-77

| | | Number of Fatalities* Annual Average | Percentage of Total |
|------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Age: | | | |
| | Not Known | 21 | 2 |
| | Under 25 Years | 190 | 17 |
| | 25 Years and Over | 944 | 82 |
| Sex: | | | |
| | Male | 1 141 | 99 |
| | Female | 14 | 1 |

^{*}Includes deaths arising out of occupational illness at the age of death.

Source: Unpublished data from Occupational Safety and Health Branch, Labour Canada.









